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Social scientists have long viewed the decision to protest as strategic, with
an individual’s participation a function of their beliefs about others’ turnout. We
conduct a framed field experiment that recalibrates individuals’ beliefs about oth-
ers’ protest participation, in the context of Hong Kong’s ongoing antiauthoritarian
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before the protest, we randomly provide a subset of subjects with truthful informa-
tion about others’ protest plans and elicit posterior beliefs about protest turnout,
again in an incentivized manner. After the protest, we elicit subjects’ actual par-
ticipation. This allows us to identify the causal effects of positively and negatively
updated beliefs about others’ protest participation on subjects’ own turnout. In
contrast with the assumptions of many recent models of protest participation,
we consistently find evidence of strategic substitutability. We provide guidance
regarding plausible sources of strategic substitutability that can be incorporated
into theoretical models of protests. JEL Codes: D74, D8, P0.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Mass political movements have long demanded fundamental
political rights. Citizens have taken to the streets fromTiananmen
Square to Tahrir Square, from the women’s suffrage movement to
the civil rights movement, from the Velvet Revolution to Hong
Kong’s Umbrella Revolution. What drives individuals’ decisions
to participate in political protests such as these?
Strategic considerations have long been seen as crucial, with
an individual’s participation shaped by their beliefs about the
participation of others. On the one hand, protests are a classic ex-
ample of a political collective action problem: individuals have an
incentive to free-ride on the costly participation of others, andmay
thus be less willing to turn out when they believe more others will
do so, thus producing a game of strategic substitutes (Olson 1965;
Tullock 1971; Palfrey and Rosenthal 1984). On the other hand,
much recent theoretical work assumes strategic complementarity:
this might arise because the cost of participation is anticipated to
be lower when a protest is larger; because participatory utility is
greater in a larger, more successful protest; or because one’s utility
under a postrevolution regime will be greater if one was a protest
participant (see, for example, Bueno de Mesquita 2010; Edmond
2013; Passarelli and Tabellini 2017; Barbera` and Jackson 2018).
Indeed, in a recent review article, Gehlbach, Sonin, and Svolik
(2016, 579) go so far as to affirm that strategic complementarity
“characterizes mass protests”1.
In this article, we identify the causal effect of beliefs about
other individuals’ protest turnout on one’s own, conducting
a framed field experiment with potential participants in an
antiauthoritarian protest in Hong Kong. We study participation
in a July 1 march, a yearly protest that represents an important
component of Hong Kong’s ongoing antiauthoritarian movement,
epitomized by the recent Umbrella Revolution.2 The July 1 march
shares many essential characteristics with antiauthoritarian
1. See also Granovetter (1978), Kuran (1989, 1991, 1997), Chwe (2000), Fearon
(2011), Kricheli, Livne, and Magaloni (2011), Egorov and Sonin (2018) for models
of protests in which participation is a game of strategic complements. Some recent
theoretical work allows for the possibility of strategic substitutability in the con-
text of the same protest game: see Shadmehr and Bernhardt (2011) and Shadmehr
(2018).
2. In Cantoni et al. (2016), we provide a complementary, descriptive study of
the characteristics of supporters of Hong Kong’s antiauthoritarian movement.
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protests across time and space: participants aim to achieve pol-
icy concessions from an authoritarian regime by turning out in
large numbers, facing the threat of government crackdown. In this
context, we experimentally recalibrate individuals’ beliefs about
others’ protest participation and study how these beliefs affect
one’s participation. We find consistent evidence of strategic sub-
stitutability in the decision to protest, challenging many recent
models of protest participation that assume strategic complemen-
tarity.
Although much theoretical work has been done on the
strategic element of the protest decision, empirical evidence on
the causal effect of beliefs regarding others’ protest turnout on
one’s own is extremely limited. Several recent articles have pro-
vided causal evidence on a bundle of “social” influences on protest
participation: Enikolopov, Makarin, and Petrova (2016) present
evidence that the diffusion of an online social network increased
protest turnout in Russia; Gonza´lez (2016) provides evidence that
peer participation in Chilean student protests increased one’s
own; and Manacorda and Tesei (2016) provide evidence that mo-
bile phones’ diffusion increased protest turnout in Africa. How-
ever, these analyses are unable to separately identify the effects
of beliefs about the protest participation of others on one’s own
participation, instead estimating the combined effects of (i) learn-
ing about a protest’s logistics (e.g., time and place), (ii) learning
about the state of the world, and (iii) learning about others’ protest
turnout.3
Credibly testing for a causal effect of beliefs about others’
turnout in the decision to protest against an authoritarian regime
has been hindered by two empirical obstacles. First, antiauthor-
itarian political movements have typically been studied ex post
(e.g., Kuran 1989, 1991, 1997; Opp and Gern 1993; Lohmann
1994). This not only generates selection issues—movements are
generally studied after they have become large and successful—
but also makes the prospective study of beliefs nearly impossible:
belief elicitation would necessarily be retrospective and likely dis-
torted by the realization of the political outcomes of interest.
Second, even when measured in real time, it is extremely
difficult to exploit variation in beliefs to identify causal effects.
3. Other recent empirical work on the causes and consequences of mass
political movements includes Madestam et al. (2013), Yanagizawa-Drott (2014),
DellaVigna et al. (2014), and Acemoglu, Hassan, and Tahoun (2014).
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Naturally occurring variation is very likely to be endogenous with
respect to behaviors of interest. Experimental variation, for ex-
ample, arising from an information treatment, runs into chal-
lenges from heterogeneous priors, which imply that the same in-
formation treatment can generate positive belief updating among
one subset of the sample (i.e., those whose priors are below
the information provided) and negative updating among another
subset.4 This means, for example, that even an effective in-
tervention may produce average treatment effects on beliefs or
behavior that spuriously appear to be null results. The average
effects would simply reflect offsetting heterogeneous treatment
effects of opposite signs. Thus, experimental interventions aimed
at manipulating beliefs require carefully measured priors (and
ideally posteriors as well) to determine exactly how the treat-
ment affects particular individuals’ beliefs, and through beliefs,
behavior.
We overcome these obstacles as follows. First, we study par-
ticipation within an ongoing, high-stakes political movement:
Hong Kong’s antiauthoritarian movement.5 Because Hong Kong’s
democrats traditionally protest the rule of the Chinese Com-
munist Party (CCP) each July 1, there exists a known protest
about which we can elicit beliefs prospectively in real time. Sec-
ond, using a three-part online experiment we conducted at the
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HKUST), we
are able to elicit the prior beliefs of more than 1,200 univer-
sity students regarding the protest turnout of their classmates
in the upcoming July 1 march (in an incentivized manner); we
are then able to provide an information treatment to a ran-
dom subset and elicit posterior beliefs (again in an incentivized
manner); finally, we are able to elicit the students’ own protest
participation.
4. See Coffman, Featherstone, and Kessler (2015) for a theoretical analysis of
the effects of information nudges.
5. The eventual success or failure of the movement is likely to have repercus-
sions throughout “greater China” (and thus around the world) given concerns in
Hong Kong, mainland China, and Taiwan over the increasingly authoritarian and
nationalistic policies undertaken by the CCP. Our work contributes to a growing
empirical literature on the political economy of the region: for example, Lorentzen
(2013) highlights the central government’s tolerance of certain types of protests;
King, Pan, and Roberts (2013) study information control policies that aim at sup-
pressing collective actions.
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The goal of our experimental design is to isolate the
causal effect of variation in beliefs regarding others’ protest
participation on one’s own protest participation. To do so, we pro-
vide a random subset of individuals in our sample truthful in-
formation intended to shift beliefs regarding others’ protest par-
ticipation. A challenge we face is that such information must be
provided prior to the protest itself—before we know the actual
protest decisions of others. To solve this problem, one week before
the protest, we collect information on individuals’ planned protest
turnout, on individuals’ beliefs about others’ planned turnout,
and individuals’ beliefs about others’ future actual turnout at the
protest. This allows us to provide truthful information regarding
others’ planned participation, plausibly affecting beliefs regarding
others’ actual protest participation.
A day before the protest, we provide a random subset of in-
dividuals in our sample truthful information about the planned
participation of their classmates. We estimate the “first-stage”
effect of information regarding others’ planned participation on
individuals’ (posterior) beliefs regarding others’ actual participa-
tion. Next we estimate the “reduced-form” effect of information re-
garding others’ planned participation on individuals’ own actual
protest participation. Importantly, we split our analysis into two
subsamples: those whose prior beliefs were below the true level
of planned participation (whose beliefs regarding actual turnout,
we expect, should be positively affected) and those whose prior
beliefs were above the true level of planned participation (whose
beliefs regarding actual turnout, we expect, should be negatively
affected).6
Our findings consistently point to our sample of Hong Kong
students viewing the strategic component of their protest decision
as being a game of strategic substitutes. Among subjects whose
prior beliefs regarding others’ planned participation were below
the truth, the experimental provision of information regarding
6. Note that in addition to providing evidence on balance between treatment
and control groups in the full experimental sample, we present evidence of balance
within each of these subsamples (see Section III). This sample split relies on our
elicitation of beliefs about both others’ planned participation and others’ actual
participation. The former gives us a measure of where priors stood relative to the
experimental information we are able to provide to subjects prior to the protest
itself (i.e., on planned participation). The latter gives us a measure of the priors we
care about when examining belief updating in the first-stage analysis (i.e., changes
in beliefs regarding actual participation).
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the true level of other subjects’ planned participation has a sig-
nificant, positive effect on beliefs about actual participation in the
protest, and a significant negative effect on subjects’ own turnout.
Among subjects whose prior beliefs regarding others’ planned par-
ticipation were above the truth, the experimental provision of
information regarding the true level of other subjects’ planned
participation has a significant, negative effect on beliefs about ac-
tual participation in the protest, and a significant positive effect
on subjects’ own turnout.
We are able to address several concerns about our
analysis. First, using list experiments, we provide evidence that
our experimental subjects are willing to truthfully report on po-
tentially sensitive political attitudes related to their participa-
tion in the July 1 protest; this helps assuage concerns regarding
our reliance on a self-reported measure of protest turnout (see
Section III.C).7 Second, we can rule out a major threat to inter-
nal validity: the possibility that information about other subjects’
turnout affected not only beliefs about others’ protest participa-
tion but also beliefs about the “quality” of the political move-
ment. Such a confounding “social learning” effect, however, would
produce the appearance of strategic complementarity, not the
strategic substitutability that we find. Third, we can address con-
cerns regarding experimenter demand effects following a similar
logic: typically, an experimenter’s implied endorsement of an ac-
tion (by indicating its popularity) would produce the appearance of
strategic complementarity (see Section IV.D).
We find suggestive evidence of three sources of strategic sub-
stitutability in our context (see Section V). First, one aim of Hong
Kong’s protests is to get a sufficient number of people onto the
street—this is a public good (as in Olson 1965; Tullock 1971;
Palfrey and Rosenthal 1984) that could have tangible conse-
quences and could serve as a signal of the movement’s strength
to the CCP and to other citizens. If subjects view attaining a
threshold level of protest participation as producing a political
public good, this will tend to produce strategic substitutability.
Consistent with protest turnout being a public good, we find that
7. One might be particularly concerned about misreporting in survey data
collected in authoritarian settings (see Reny 2016 for a discussion of challenges
facing social scientists in China). Indeed, analyses of political behavior in real time
are more common in settings that are already politically free (e.g., Gerber et al.
2011, 2017).
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more prosocial subjects aremore likely to protest, even conditional
on ideology. Second, experimental subjects perceive a greater
likelihood of a protest’s success as protest size increases and
a greater likelihood of government crackdown. If the latter
dominates, the result can be strategic substitutability. Third, sub-
jects may have social image concerns, and select into protest par-
ticipation in part to signal their ideological “type” (as in Be´nabou
and Tirole 2011). If participation in a smaller protest sends a
strong enough signal, individuals wanting to signal their antiau-
thoritarian ideology may differentially participate when they an-
ticipate a protest will be small, thus producing a game of strategic
substitutes. Consistent with this mechanism, we find that individ-
uals who participate in the protests after learning that protests
will be smaller than expected have ideologically more extreme
friends than other protest participants.
Our results thus indicate that protests are not generically
games of strategic complements—as assumed in much recent
work. Models of protest participation must allow for the possibil-
ity of strategic substitutes. Yet it is important to emphasize that
not all of the mechanisms we observe at work in Hong Kong will
be present in all protests, and even if they are present, they will
not always outweigh forces generating strategic complementarity
emphasized in other work. As we discuss in Section VI, we be-
lieve that our findings reflect the fact that Hong Kong’s protests
are part of a long-running movement and that the Hong Kong
government protects basic rights of association and expression.
Strategic substitutability thus seems most likely to appear in
protests that are part of larger movements and protests demand-
ing rights from partially democratic regimes, while forces push-
ing toward strategic complementarity may dominate in one-shot
protests that will end in the ousting of a dictator or the crushing
of a movement.
In Section II we provide an overview of Hong Kong’s ongoing
democratic, antiauthoritarian movement and the July 1 march
in particular. In Section III we describe our experimental de-
sign. In Section IV we present our main findings and discuss
threats to internal validity. In Section V we discuss the theoretical
implications of our findings and the characteristics of our set-
ting that may generate strategic substitutability in the protest
game. Finally, in Section VI, we discuss conditions under which
strategic substitutability or complementarity are more likely, and
offer concluding thoughts.
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II. HONG KONG’S ANTIAUTHORITARIAN MOVEMENT
II.A. Political Context
Prior to 1997, Hong Kong was a British colony, with limited
democratic political rights but strong protections of civil liberties
and respect for the rule of law. On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong was
returned to the People’s Republic of China, to be ruled as a Spe-
cial Administrative Region with its own quasi constitution—the
Basic Law—and a promise from China that its institutions would
be respected and maintained until 2047, under a policy known as
“one country, two systems.” The Basic Law left ambiguous sev-
eral important details that have been bargained and battled over
between the so-called pan-democracy and pro-Beijing camps.
The first ambiguity to generate mass political protests was
regarding Article 23 of the Basic Law, which covered the legal reg-
ulation of speech and behavior that threatened the government.
Under Beijing’s encouragement, a law implementing provisions of
Article 23—the National Security Bill—was proposed by the Hong
Kong chief executive (the head of government) in September 2002
and was seen by many Hong Kong citizens as deeply threatening
to their human rights and civil liberties.8 The proposed legisla-
tion catalyzed a massive July 1 march (in 2003) in which an esti-
mated half a million people protested. This expression of popular
opposition led to the withdrawal of the bill, and no legislation on
Article 23 has passed since.
More recently, political conflict has arisen from a second
ambiguity in the Basic Law, regarding the method of selection
of Hong Kong’s chief executive. Article 45 of the Basic Law
states the following: “The method for selecting the Chief Exec-
utive shall be specified in the light of the actual situation in the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region ... The ultimate aim is
the selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon
nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee
in accordance with democratic procedures.” While indicating an
ultimate aim of universal suffrage, the Basic Law does not state
when elections will be introduced, nor does it clarify the details of
nomination. From Hong Kong’s return to China until today, the
chief executive has been selected by an election committee, rather
8. For a discussion of these concerns, see theUniversity of HongKong’sHuman
Rights Portal Page, “Research on Article 23,” online at https://goo.gl/GdNcHY,
accessed February 28, 2018.
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than by universal suffrage; currently, the committee is composed
of 1,200 members, and is widely seen as pro-Beijing.
In 2014, the Twelfth National People’s Congress proposed
an election mode that would have allowed the citizens of Hong
Kong a choice between two or three candidates, but these can-
didates would be selected by the same pro-Beijing committee as
before.9 In response to this limited expansion of democratic rights,
a massive July 1 march was mobilized, with hundreds of thou-
sands of citizens taking to the streets. Further escalation and
a police crackdown precipitated the even larger-scale Umbrella
Revolution, named for the ubiquitous umbrellas carried by par-
ticipants. The Umbrella Revolution persisted for months, being
slowly cleared out by police by the end of December 2014. Although
the movement did not alter the policy proposed by Beijing, it did
send a clear signal to the Hong Kong legislature (the “LegCo”)
that a circumscribed change in institutions was unacceptable to
the people of Hong Kong. In June 2015, the LegCo struck down
the Chinese proposal led by the opposition of the pan-democratic
camp.
Since June 2015, the democratic movement in Hong Kong has
both fragmented and radicalized. Recent encroachments on Hong
Kong citizens’ civil liberties, including the arrest of Hong Kong
booksellers by the mainland Chinese government, have deepened
some citizens’ fear of the CCP and their sense of a Hong Kong
identity very much distinct from—even opposed to—that of main-
land China. The result is that Hong Kong citizens and political
parties are nowmuchmore loudly calling for independence or self-
determination. “Localist” violence has occasionally flared; new po-
litical parties, such as the student-led Demosisto¯, have formed
and won seats in the 2016 LegCo election on platforms explicitly
calling for self-determination.10
II.B. The July 1 Marches: Characteristics and Achievements
Marches on the anniversary of Hong Kong’s handover to
China, held each July 1, have been described as “the spirit of
9. Refer to https://goo.gl/0oyNmt, accessed February 28, 2018.
10. The legislators elected on a self-determination platform were since
removed from office on various technicalities regarding their oath-taking, fore-
shadowing future conflict.
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democratic struggle in Hong Kong.”11 The July 1 marches have
played an important role in Hong Kong citizens’ political en-
gagement with the Chinese government and have achieved major
policy changes and even constitutional concessions—particularly
when large crowds of protesters were mobilized.12 Each protest
march, while part of a broader antiauthoritarian, democratic
movement, is organized around a specific set of issues and pol-
icy aims. The first notable achievement came as a response to
the CCP’s September 2002 proposal for an antisubversion bill un-
der Article 23, described above. The July 1, 2003, march included
around 500,000 people—the largest political gathering in Hong
Kong since the Chinese democracy movement of 1989. Not only
was the proposed law withdrawn, the march eventually forced the
resignation of multiple government officials, including the chief
executive, Tung Chee-hwa.13
Another success followed the 2012 march, which included
up to 400,000 people, and was part of a mobilization against a
CCP proposal for a mandatory “moral and national curriculum”
in Hong Kong schools. This proposal, too, was withdrawn shortly
after the march. The 2014 march again saw hundreds of thou-
sands of people demanding the popular nomination of chief ex-
ecutive candidates in the 2017 election. Although the march did
not achieve citizen nomination of chief executive candidates, it did
produce the massive Umbrella Revolution and led to the rejection
of the CCP’s proposal for partial democratic rights.
Like others before it, the July 1, 2016, march studied here
was organized around important political aims: first, to denounce
the perceived corruption of Beijing-backed Chief Executive C. Y.
Leung; second, to mobilize support for democratic—especially the
newly established localist—political parties in the run-up to the
2016 LegCo elections. Although the protest was smaller than some
previous marches (turnout was under 100,000 participants), it is
11. “Sixteen Years of July 1st Marches: A Dynamic History of Hong Kong Cit-
izens’ Fight for Democracy,” Initium Media, June 30, 2018, https://goo.gl/8bZDrf,
accessed July 5, 2018.
12. A time series of turnout in July 1 marches can be seen in Online Appendix
Figure A.1.
13. In an opinion piece tellingly titled “July 1st March Turnout Size Is Ab-
solutely Important,” former LegCo member Margaret Ng Ngoi-yee writes, “The
turnout at the July 1st Marches is absolutely important. If not for 500,000 people
taking to the street in 2003, Article 23 would have been legislated already.” Stand
News, June 29, 2018, https://goo.gl/vgP3WP, accessed July 5, 2018.
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noteworthy that Leung chose not to run for reelection in 2017,
despite being unconstrained by term limits; parties opposed to
Beijing won 55% of the LegCo vote share, with localist political
parties winning nearly 20% of the vote in the 2016 election.14
Some characteristics of Hong Kong’s July 1 marches may ap-
pear idiosyncratic: they are regularly scheduled events, and they
are largely tolerated by an authoritarian government. In fact,
these characteristics appear in other contexts. First, regularly
scheduled protests are utilized by many antiauthoritarian move-
ments, from Russia’s Strategy 31 movement demanding rights
of assembly to the Monday demonstrations in Leipzig that pre-
cipitated the fall of the German Democratic Republic.15 Second,
authoritarian regimes are often surprisingly tolerant of protests,
within limits. The Monday demonstrations in Leipzig were able to
proceed in the late summer and autumn of 1989 despite the obvi-
ous possibility of crackdown.16 In Russia, protesters recently orga-
nized rallies in support of opposition politician Alexei Navalny on
Vladimir Putin’s 65th birthday, inOctober 2017, and theFinancial
Times notes that in response to a protest of around 1,000 people in
Moscow, “police largely left protesters alone.”17 Even in mainland
China, the CCP tolerates particular protests (Lorentzen 2013). In
each of these settings, there exists a threat of crackdown ex ante,
and—even in Hong Kong—police do crack down when protests
cross the line.
Thus, like other antiauthoritarian protests, Hong Kong’s July
1 marches demand (and occasionally win) fundamental political
rights—civil liberties and democratic institutions—from an au-
thoritarian regime. Like other antiauthoritarian protests, turnout
is important for success. The importance of protest size can be
14. Even using lower-end estimates of the protest size (30,000), as a percentage
of the population, this would make the 2016 July 1 march around one-third of the
size of the largest protest in U.S. history, the Women’s March in 2017.
15. Strategy 31 is discussed by Luke Harding in “The Russian Protesters Who
Won’t Give Up,” The Guardian, August 30, 2010, https://goo.gl/vfwZro, accessed
December 9, 2017. Weeks of modestly sized, regularly scheduled protests prior to
the massive events that led to the fall of the Berlin Wall can be seen in Online
Appendix Figure A.2.
16. See Andrew Curry, “A Peaceful Revolution in Leipzig,” Spiegel Online,
October 9, 2009, https://goo.gl/iUakCp, accessed December 9, 2017.
17. Several dozen protesters were detained and then released in St. Peters-
burg, which saw a protest of more than 2,000 people. See Max Seddon and Henry
Foy, “Anti-Putin Protests Mark Russian President’s Birthday,” Financial Times,
October 7, 2017, https://goo.gl/4oWQzA, accessed December 9, 2017.
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FIGURE I
Students’ Beliefs Regarding the Benefits (the Chance of Achieving Democratic
Institutions in Hong Kong) and Costs (the Chance of a Violent Government
Crackdown) for Hypothetical Protests with Different Turnout Levels, Ranging
from 10,000 to 1,250,000 Participants
seen in our survey data: subjects in our experiment believe there
is a higher likelihood of protest success if a protest is larger (see
Figure I). It can also be seen in the differences between July 1
march organizers’ turnout estimates and the turnout estimates
of the Hong Kong police. Organizers consistently exceed indepen-
dent estimates of July 1 march size (and police estimates con-
sistently fall below), with differences between the two reaching
the tens or even hundreds of thousands (see Online Appendix
Figure A.1).
Finally, like other antiauthoritarian protests, there is the po-
tential for a high personal cost for turnout. Chinese authorities
are deeply concerned about political instability in Hong Kong, at
least in part because of potential spillovers intomainlandChina.18
Thus, beyond the time cost and the experience of heat, humid-
ity, and rain on a summer’s day, the concern of the Chinese gov-
ernment implies the potential for high participation costs: the
possibility of arrest and forceful police crackdowns using batons
and tear gas—which have already occurred—and the potential
18. The Chinese government blocked Instagram—the last major uncensored
social media platform available inside the Great Firewall—when the Umbrella
Revolution broke out at the end of September 2014 (Hobbs and Roberts 2018).
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for more violent suppression, particularly by the People’s Liber-
ation Army stationed in Hong Kong. A New York Times article
describes the Umbrella Revolution in frightening terms: “On the
first night, and for the next twoweeks, rumors rippled through the
[protesters’] camp. Protesters were fearful of a bloody crackdown,
like what happened in Tiananmen Square.” Interestingly, subjects
in our experiment believe there is a higher likelihood of a govern-
ment crackdown if a protest is larger (see Figure I). Our find-
ing that beliefs about protest success and government crackdown
both increase with protest size suggest that (much like in other
antiauthoritarian protests) there are forces for strategic comple-
mentarity and for strategic substitutability in the July 1 march.19
III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
III.A. Design Overview
Our experiment was conducted online in three parts.20 The
goal of our experimental design is to isolate the causal effect
of variation in beliefs regarding others’ protest participation on
one’s own protest participation. To do so, we provide a random
subset of individuals in our sample with truthful information
intended to shift beliefs regarding others’ protest participation. A
19. We discuss limitations on the generalizability of the Hong Kong context
in the Conclusion (Section VI).
20. The experiment described here was preregistered with the AEA along
with a second experiment, which varied persuasive messages regarding a demo-
cratic political party and examined the effects of these messages on contributions
to that party as well as on political attitudes and beliefs. The “persuasion” ex-
periment was completed in Part 1 of the study, and was cross-randomized with
the intervention studied here; importantly, all of the data collection for the other
experiment occurred prior to the experimental intervention studied here (which
was implemented in Part 2 of the study). Reflecting the cross-randomization of the
two experiments, in Online Appendix Table A.1, we show that the variables col-
lected in Part 1 are generally balanced between the treatment and control groups
in this study. In Section IV, we examine the impact of the unbalanced “Part 1”
variables on our treatment effects, and find that they have almost no effect on our
treatment effect estimates (results are reported in Online Appendix Table A.2).
It is important to emphasize that the outcome variables considered in this ar-
ticle’s analysis—posterior beliefs about the participation of others and subjects’
own protest participation (collected in Part 3 of the study)—were the only outcome
variables we collected following the experimental intervention we study here. We
provide the full set of survey questions asked in Part 1 of the experiment (refor-
matted for brevity and organized thematically) in Online Appendix A.1. The full
text of Parts 2 and 3 of the study are reproduced in Online Appendices A.2 and A.3,
respectively.
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challenge we face is that such information must be provided prior
to the protest itself—before we know the actual protest decisions
of others.
We solve this problem by collecting information on individ-
uals’ beliefs about others’ planned turnout, as well as beliefs
about others’ future actual turnout at the protest. These should
be closely related, and crucially, we are able to elicit planned
protest participation (as opposed to actual participation) prior to
the protest. This allows us to provide truthful information re-
garding others’ planned participation, plausibly affecting beliefs
regarding others’ actual protest participation.
We first estimate the “first-stage” effect of information re-
garding others’ planned participation on individuals’ (posterior)
beliefs regarding others’ actual participation. Next we estimate
the “reduced-form” effect of information treatment regarding oth-
ers’ planned participation on individuals’ own actual protest par-
ticipation. Putting together the first stage and the reduced form,
we can estimate the effect of a change in beliefs about others’
participation on one’s own using two-stage least squares.21
The broad outline of the design is as follows:
i. Part 1: On June 24, 2016, we elicited subjects’ own
planned participation in the upcoming July 1 march.
21. We discuss this two-stage estimate, particularly the implied exclusion
restriction, in more detail below.
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We also elicited subjects’ beliefs regarding other subjects’
planned protest participation. We refer to these as elicited
priors regarding other subjects’ planned participation.
In the same survey, we elicited subjects’ beliefs regard-
ing other subjects’ actual protest participation on July 1,
2016. We refer to these as elicited priors regarding other
subjects’ actual participation. Finally, we elicited subjects’
beliefs regarding the total protest participation among all
Hong Kong citizens on July 1, 2016. We refer to these as
elicited priors regarding total actual turnout among all
HK citizens.
ii. Part 2: On June 30, 2016, we provided a random sub-
set of our experimental sample with a reminder of their
prior beliefs regarding other subjects’ planned participa-
tion, as well as information regarding the true level of
planned protest participation in the experimental sam-
ple.22 For both the information treatment group and the
control group, we again elicited beliefs regarding other
subjects’ actual protest participation on July 1, 2016. We
refer to these as elicited posteriors regarding other sub-
jects’ actual participation. Comparing posteriors between
the treatment and control groups provides an estimate
of the first-stage relationship. We also elicited subjects’
beliefs regarding the total protest participation among all
Hong Kong citizens on July 1, 2016. We refer to these
as posteriors regarding total actual turnout among HK
citizens.
iii. Part 3: On July 15, 2016, we elicited subjects’ participa-
tion in the July 1 protest. Comparing participation rates
between the treatment and control groups provides an es-
timate of the reduced-form relationship of interest. Self-
reported July 1 protest participation is also the outcome in
our two-stage estimates of the effects of beliefs regarding
others’ protest participation on one’s own.
III.B. Experimental Sample
Our sample of experimental subjects is drawn from the pop-
ulation of students at HKUST. Studying a sample of students
22. We provide the reminder of subjects’ priors to make the information treat-
ment more salient, thus potentially increasing the power of our intervention. Of
course, the reminder might serve as an anchor for subjects’ responses, which could
attenuate the treatment’s effects.
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to understand protest participation is ideal given students’ im-
portance in Hong Kong’s democratic movement and in the local-
ist political parties pursuing self-determination. In Part 1 of the
study, we recruited participants on June 24, 2016, sending an
email to the entire undergraduate population of HKUST.23 We
received 1,741 completed surveys, achieving a response rate of
19.1%. Among these, we focus on the 1,576 students who were ei-
ther born in Hong Kong or moved there prior to high school (Hong
Kong “natives”). Part 1 of the experiment elicited students’ polit-
ical preferences, beliefs, attitudes, and planned and past political
protest behavior. Because protests occur every year on Handover
Day, July 1, we asked a series of questions specifically eliciting
planned participation in the upcoming July 1 protest, as well as
(prior) beliefs about turnout at the protest.
We paid students for their participation and provided
additional payments as a function of their choices in incentivized
games and in incentivized belief elicitations. On average, respon-
dents receivedHK$205, approximatelyUS$25, for completing this
first survey. Our experimental intervention was conducted in Part
2 of the study, a very short online survey sent in an email on
June 30, 2016, and completed by 1,303 Hong Kong native stu-
dents. Along with the experimental intervention of interest, this
second survey elicited (posterior) beliefs about turnout in the fol-
lowing day’s protest. Students received a payment of HK$25 for
completing the survey. Finally, in Part 3 of the study, we elicited
students’ participation in the July 1 protest of 2016 in a third
online survey sent via email on July 15, 2016, and completed by
1,234 Hong Kong native students. Students who completed Part 3
of the study received an additional payment of HK$25.We present
summary statistics for the observable characteristics of the
experimental sample—those subjects who completed all three
parts of the study—in Table I, columns (1) and (2).24
23. Our recruitment email informed students that we were researchers at
HKUST, UC Berkeley, Stanford, and the University of Munich interested in un-
derstanding attitudes and preferences among college students in Hong Kong. The
initial email did not explicitly mention our interest in political attitudes. All
experimental materials were provided in English, the primary language of in-
struction at HKUST. Some bilingual support (i.e., materials provided in Chinese
characters) was provided to clarify key terms.
24. In Online Appendix Table A.3 we present summary statistics for the 1,576
Hong Kong native students who completed Part 1 of the experiment, and for the
1,234 students in our experimental sample. One can see that the two groups
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III.C. Elicitation of Plans, Beliefs, and Actual Protest
Participation
1. Subjects’ Planned Participation and Prior Beliefs. In Part
1 of the study, on June 24, 2016, we elicited subjects’ own planned
participation in the upcoming July 1, 2016, antiauthoritarian
protest, asking the question that appears in Box I.
We next elicited subjects’ beliefs regarding other subjects’
planned protest participation (i.e., elicited priors regarding
planned participation). This elicitation, like all other belief elici-
tation in this study, was conducted in an incentivized manner.25
Specifically, we asked the question that appears in Box II.
In the same survey, we elicited subjects’ beliefs regarding
other subjects’ actual protest participation on July 1, 2016 (i.e.,
elicited priors regarding actual participation). We asked the ques-
tion that appears in Box III.
Responses in Part 1 indicated that 16.9% of all subjects
(including nonnative Hong Kong students) planned to participate
in the July 1 protest of 2016 (i.e., answered either “Yes” or “Not
sure yet, but more likely than not” to the question regarding their
plans for the upcoming July 1 protest). This is the number we use
to provide “true” information regarding planned participation to
experimental subjects (rounding to 17%). The experimental sam-
ple’s average prior belief regarding planned protest participation
was quite close to the truth, at 15.8%, but there was a great deal of
variation around the truth (the standard deviation was also 15.8
percentage points).
are extremely similar. The experimental sample of students is also similar to—
though not precisely representative of—the broader HKUST student body on the
dimensions of school of enrollment (i.e., students’ broad academic area), gender,
and cohort (see Online Appendix Table A.4). Note that all of our findings are robust
to reweighting our experimental sample to match the composition of the HKUST
student body or to match the composition of the 1,576 Hong Kong native students
who completed Part 1 of the experiment (see Section IV.D).
25. The survey and the incentives are necessarily coarse: we elicit respondents’
beliefs on howmany other subjects answered “Yes” or “Not sure yet, butmore likely
than not,” not the entire distribution of beliefs. This corresponds to providing an
incentive for subjects to report their belief regarding the modal outcome, rather
than the mean (though these will correspond if subjects’ distributions of beliefs
are symmetric and single-peaked). We find that the distribution of prior beliefs
regarding other students’ planned participation has a mean and a mode very close
to the true level of planned participation in the sample. This is consistent with the
incentives we provided generating thoughtful, truthful responses.
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BOX I: (O) OWN REPORT ON PLAN
Are you planning to participate in the July 1st march in 2016?
1 Yes
2 Not sure yet, but more likely than not
3 Not sure yet, but more unlikely than yes
4 No
BOX II: (P1) BELIEFS ABOUT PLANNED
Please guess what percentage of the participants from HKUST of this study plan
to participate in the July 1st march in 2016 (answer either “Yes” or “Not sure yet,
but more likely than not” to the above question on July 1st March in 2016).
If your guess is within 2 percentage points of the percent of students who
actually answer either “Yes” or “Not sure yet, but more likely than not,” you will
earn a bonus payment of HK$10.
BOX III: (A1) BELIEFS ABOUT ACTUAL (HKUST STUDENTS)
Please guess what percentage of the participants from HKUST of this study will
participate in the July 1st march in 2016.
If your guess is within 2 percentage points of the percent of students who
actually participate, you will earn a bonus payment of HK$10.
The sample’s average prior belief regarding others’ actual par-
ticipation in the July 1 protest was 13.8%, slightly below the aver-
age prior belief about others’ planned participation. Prior beliefs
about others’ planned and actual participation are strongly asso-
ciated, as expected (the correlation is 0.83).26
Finally, we elicited subjects’ prior beliefs regarding the total
actual turnout at the July 1 march. We asked the question that
appears in Box IV.
The experimental sample’s average prior belief regarding to-
tal turnout in the July 1 protest was 155,153.
2. The Experimental Intervention and Posterior Beliefs. In
Part 2 of the study, on June 30, 2016, we implemented the
26. In Online Appendix Figure A.3, we present the distributions of subjects’
prior beliefs regarding others’ planned participation and regarding others’ actual
participation. One can see in the figure that the distribution of priors regarding
actual participation is shifted slightly to the left of the distribution of beliefs
regarding planned participation.
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BOX IV: (A1) BELIEFS ABOUT ACTUAL (HK POPULATION)
How many people in total do you think will participate in the
July 1st march in 2016?
If your guess is within 10% of what will be reported by the HKUPOP
after the July 1st march in 2016, then you will earn a bonus payment of HK$10.
To give you a sense, according to HKUPOP’s report, among the July 1st march
that took place between 2003 and 2015:
The lowest attendance in a given year is: 17,000 (in 2008);
The highest attendance in a given year is: 462,000 (in 2003).
experimental intervention, randomly assigning two-thirds of sub-
jects to the treatment group and one-third to the control group.27
In Table I, columns (1)–(3), we present data on the background
characteristics, economic status, protest plans, and prior beliefs
of the treatment and control groups, and test for balance between
them. One can see that the treatment and control groups are very
similar on these margins. As discussed already, the impact of an
information shock on beliefs, and thus behavior, should differ (hav-
ing effects of opposite sign) depending on whether the information
provided was above or below individuals’ prior beliefs. We conduct
much of our analysis separately examining individuals with pri-
ors above and below the information treatment, or pooling all
subjects, but coding the treatment indicator as being equal to −1
for individuals with prior beliefs above the information treatment
to make the treatment effect monotonic.28 It is thus important to
check for balance in the two subsamples of interest—subjects with
priors above and below the true value of planned participation of
27. The decision to assign more individuals to the treatment group was made
anticipating the possibility that some subjects may have ignored Part 2 of the
study, and thus effectively ended up in the control condition. Under such a scenario,
we could have examined protest behavior among individuals who were actually
treated and among individuals who were assigned to the control condition or who
did not complete the survey in Part 2 of the study. In practice, the vast majority
of subjects completed all three parts of the study, so the additional individuals in
the treatment group were not strictly necessary.
28. It is important to note that variation in individuals’ prior beliefs was not
experimentally induced. In Online Appendix Table A.5, we present predictors of
individuals’ own self-reported plans to participate in the protest as well as predic-
tors of individuals’ prior beliefs regarding other subjects’ planned participation.
We discuss the endogeneity of priors further in Section IV.
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BOX V: REMINDER OF (P1), SAMPLE AVERAGE OF (O)
Recall that you guessed that [Part 1 response]% of HKUST survey participants
would plan to attend the July 1 march.
Based on last week’s survey, the true percentage of survey participants who plan
to attend the July 1 march is 17%.
BOX VI: REMINDER OF (A1)
Remember that we offered you:
1—A HK$10 bonus payment for accurately guessing the percentage of HKUST
survey participants who would actually attend this July 1 march;
2—An additional HK$10 bonus payment for accurately guessing the total
number of Hong Kong citizens who would actually attend this July 1 march.
In last week’s survey, you guessed that:
1—[Part 1 response]% of HKUST survey participants would attend this July 1
march;
2—A total of [Part 1 response] Hong Kong citizens would attend this July 1
march.
17%. One can see in Table I, columns (4)–(9), that treatment and
control groups within each subsample are well balanced.29
Individuals in the treatment group—but not the control
group—were reminded of their responses from Part 1 regarding
other subjects’ planned participation in the July 1 protest of 2016,
and then told the actual level of other subjects’ planned partici-
pation, as shown in Box V.
All subjects (treatment and control) were reminded of their
responses from Part 1 regarding actual participation in the July
1 protest of 2016 (see Box VI).
All subjects were then given an opportunity to update their
responses from Part 1 (see Box VII).
The experimental sample’s average posterior belief regarding
the percentage of other subjects who would actually participate
29. As noted already, the survey in Part 1 elicited a broad range of subject
characteristics: political attitudes and beliefs; personality traits; and, preferences
(among others). We present a comprehensive set of balance tests (for the entire
experimental sample and for the two subsamples of interest) for 49 different vari-
ables in Online Appendix Table A.1, andwe find statistically significant differences
(at the 10% level) for 8 of the 49. In Section IV, we examine the impact of the unbal-
anced Part 1 variables on our treatment effects, and find that they have almost no
effect on our treatment effect estimates (results are reported in Online Appendix
Table A.2).
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BOX VII: (A2) BELIEFS ABOUT ACTUAL (HKUST STUDENTS)
Perhaps since then your views have changed.
We now ask you again to provide guesses about actual attendance of the July 1
march.
Instead of your guesses in the previous survey, we will use today’s guesses to
determine your bonus payment.∗
1 How many people in total do you think will participate in the July 1st march in
2016?
If your guess is within 10% of what will be reported by the HKUPOP after the
July 1st march in 2016, then you will earn a bonus payment of HK$10.
To give you a sense, according to HKUPOP’s report, among the July 1st march
that took place between 2003 and 2015:
The lowest attendance in a given year is: 17,000 (in 2008);
The highest attendance in a given year is: 462,000 (in 2003).
2 Please guess what percentage of the participants from HKUST of this study
will participate in the July 1st march in 2016?
If your guess is within 2 percentage points of the percent of students who
actually participate, you will earn a bonus payment of HK$10.
∗We chose to pay subjects based on their responses in Part 2 (rather than using responses in both Part 1
and Part 2) to minimize any income effects or strategic incentives (e.g., hedging). By reminding subjects of
their responses in Part 1 and allowing them to hold the same posteriors as priors, subjects were still able to
be paid based on their Part 1 responses.
in the July 1 protest was 14.5%; the average posterior belief
regarding total actual turnout among Hong Kong citizens was
142,684. In fact, the July 1 protest of 2016 was smaller than sub-
jects expected: the protest was attended by 3% of experimental
subjects, and only 26,000 people overall.30
3. Measuring Protest Participation. In Part 3 of the study,
on July 15, 2016, we elicited subjects’ participation in the July 1
protest of 2016.31 We asked subjects “Did you attend the July 1,
30. The smaller than expected protest was perhaps the result of an announce-
ment on the morning of July 1 that the arrested and returned Hong Kong book-
seller Lam Wing-kee would not lead the protest, as had been expected, out of fear
for his safety. The Hong Kong Free Press headlined an article on June 28, “Organ-
isers Expect 100,000 to Attend July 1 Democracy Rally Led by Bookseller and Ex-
Prisoners of Conscience” (https://goo.gl/kgDYr1, accessed December 19, 2016). The
same source headlined an article on July 1, “ReturnedHKBooksellerWill Not Lead
July 1 Democracy March after ‘Serious Threat’ to Safety” (https://goo.gl/dHcR9b,
accessed December 19, 2016).
31. We waited two weeks before collecting information on march attendance,
as this gave us time to gauge whether subjects would be comfortable responding
to a direct question about attendance. Because there had been no arrests in the
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/qje/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/qje/qjz002/5298503 by London School of Econom
ics user on 21 M
arch 2019
PROTESTS AS STRATEGIC GAMES 23
2016 March?” A response of “yes” to this question is our measure
of individuals’ protest participation.32
An important concern regarding our measure of protest par-
ticipation is that experimental subjects may not report on their
participation truthfully. This concern is particularly relevant in
the context of an ongoing antiauthoritarian movement. However,
there are several reasons to believe that self-reported protest
turnout is a good measure in our context.33 First, the particu-
lar protest that we study remained peaceful. While subjects faced
a risk of government crackdown on the protest ex ante, there was
no concern regarding legal sanctions on participants two weeks
after the protest, when subjects’ protest participation was elicited.
Second, for fear of government sanction to produce measurement
error, it would need to be the case that subjects were willing to
take the risk of attending a (very public) protest, but unwilling
to tell us in a private survey that they did so. Although this is
possible (they may misperceive the observability of their protest
choice and fear putting their behavior on the record), it strikes us
as unlikely.
As amore direct test of our experimental subjects’ willingness
to truthfully respond to politically sensitive survey questions, in
Part 1 of the study we elicited several key dimensions of political
ideology that may be considered sensitive using “list experiments”
(or the item count technique; Raghavarao and Federer 1979). The
list experiment provides cover for the expression of possibly stig-
matized attitudes at the individual level but allows the researcher
to estimate the prevalence of these attitudes at the population
level. We adopt a modified version of the standard list experiment
(Coffman, Coffman, and Ericson 2017) in which we also directly
elicit the potentially stigmatized attitudes from the control group.
Thus, for each potentially sensitive political attitude, we are able
weeks after the march, we felt comfortable asking subjects directly about their
participation.
32. We also ask those who attended the march a small number of follow-up
questions. First, we asked them to indicate which of 28 groups’ crowds they joined
at the protest (we also gave them the option of “Others”). Next, we asked for
general impressions of the protest in an open-ended manner, subject to a 300-word
maximum. Finally, we asked about the number of their friends who attended the
protest. Because these questions were only asked of individuals who attended the
march, we do not consider them outcome variables in this analysis.
33. This discussion of Hong Kong students’ willingness to report their political
attitudes and behavior truthfully closely follows Cantoni et al. (2016).
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TABLE II
ITEM COUNT EXPERIMENTS AND WILLINGNESS TO RESPOND TO DIRECT QUESTIONS
“Yes” in  When
Attitudes direct question cover is provided
Unfavorable view of CCP 0.923 0.020
[0.059]
Consider self Hong Kongese 0.878 − 0.063
[0.051]
Support for HK independence 0.465 0.057
[0.057]
Support violence in pursuit of HK’s 0.216 0.173***
political rights [0.050]
Notes. The left column presents the fraction of 790 Hong Kong local students who expressed the corre-
sponding attitude in response to a direct question. The right column presents the difference between that
fraction and the fraction estimated to support the attitude using the item count technique (list experiment).
The 790 students asked the direct questions also represent the control group for the list experiment; the
remaining 786 Hong Kong local students represent the treatment group. Assignment to “direct question” and
“list experiment” conditions was random among individuals who completed Part 1 of the study. *: Significant
at 10%; **: 5%; ***: 1%. This table also appears in Cantoni et al. (2016).
to compare the study sample’s estimated adherence to that atti-
tude when cover is provided (based on our list experiment) with
the expressed adherence to that attitude in response to a direct
question (from the control group). We can then test whether there
exists a significant distortion in the expression of a particular
attitude in response to a direct question (e.g., due to stigma or
fear).
In Table II, we present the fraction of our sample expressing
support for Hong Kong independence; who consider themselves
Hong Kongese rather than Chinese; who have a favorable view
of the ruling CCP; and who support the use of violence in pur-
suit of Hong Kong’s political rights (these estimates are based on
subjects completing Part 1 of the study). In the left column, we
simply present the population estimate of adherence to a political
attitude based on direct questions. In the right column, we show
the difference between the estimate based on direct questions
and the estimate based on the list experiment. One can see
that for three of the political attitudes, there is no significant
effect of providing respondents with cover for expressing their
views: this is true even for self-reported support for Hong Kong’s
independence—a much more extreme political position than sim-
ply attending a July 1 march.
Observing that the provision of cover by the list experiment
does not affect estimated support for several sensitive attitudes,
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one might have been concerned that the “cover” provided by the
list experiment was insufficient to elicit truthful reporting. How-
ever, Table II does show one significant difference between direct
elicitation and list experiments: many students in our sample sup-
port the use of violence to achieve Hong Kong’s political rights but
are afraid to say so when directly asked. Finding a significant gap
between direct questions and the list experiment on this dimen-
sion suggests that subjects do value the cover provided by the list
experiment when it is needed—but it is not needed in response
to political questions within the range of nonviolent opposition to
the CCP. Because participation in the July 1 march falls within
this nonviolent range, we are confident that subjects are willing
to respond truthfully in response to direct questions about their
participation.
IV. MAIN RESULTS
IV.A. The First Stage: Effects on Posterior Beliefs
We begin by presenting the effects of the information treat-
ment on individuals’ beliefs regarding actual participation in the
July 1 march—the first stage. Our focus is on posterior beliefs re-
garding the percentage of other experimental subjects who would
actually participate in the July 1 march, rather than on beliefs
regarding the total number of participants in the Hong Kong pop-
ulation. The former beliefs aremore directly linked to the informa-
tion provided regarding subjects’ planned participation. We also
present some evidence on posterior beliefs regarding total turnout
among HK citizens.
The effect of the information treatment—reminding treat-
ment group subjects of their prior beliefs regarding other sub-
jects’ planned participation and informing them that 17% of
experimental subjects planned to attend the protest—can be
seen in the distributions of beliefs regarding subjects’ actual
participation, presented in Figure II. Given that the information
we provided to subjectswas above the prior beliefs of some (regard-
ing planned participation) and below the prior beliefs of others,
if subjects believed that the information provided was truthful
and updated their priors regarding actual participation in the
direction of the new information, one would expect to see a more
compressed distribution of posteriors in the treatment group than
in the control group. Indeed, this is precisely what one observes
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FIGURE II
Distribution of Prior Beliefs and Posterior Beliefs Regarding the Actual Protest
Participation of HKUST Survey Participants
in Figure II: one can see in the figure that the treatment group’s
posteriors are distributed much more tightly between 10% and
20%.34
We more closely examine the anticipated heterogeneous ef-
fects of the information treatment depending on subjects’ prior
beliefs. In Figure III, we present a binned scatter plot of the
change in beliefs (posteriors minus priors) regarding other sub-
jects’ actual participation against subjects’ priors regarding other
subjects’ planned participation. In the left panel, one can see that,
as predicted, subjects in the treatment group with priors regard-
ing planned participation below (above) the information provided
consistently updated their beliefs regarding other subjects’ actual
participation positively (negatively). Subjects in the treatment
group with priors more distant from the information provided
updated their beliefs more than those with priors closer to the
information provided. Individuals in the control group with lower
priors tended to update their beliefs positively, and vice versa, but
the changes in beliefs are tiny compared to those observed in the
treatment group (see the right panel of Figure III).35
34. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of equality of posterior distributions between
the treatment and control groups strongly rejects the null (p < .001).
35. The updating of beliefs among the control group may result from newly
acquired information from outside the study, or from information spilling over from
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FIGURE III
Changes in Beliefs (Posteriors Minus Priors) Regarding the Actual Protest
Participation of HKUST Survey Participants, Presented Separately by Subjects’
Treatment Status
Observing that belief updating in the treatment group sys-
tematically differs in sign between subjects with priors above and
below the information provided, we present in Figure IV the prior
and posterior beliefs regarding other subjects’ actual participa-
tion for the treatment and control groups, split by priors regarding
planned participation above and below the information treatment.
Recall that treatment and control groups are generally balanced
on observable characteristics within each of these subsets (see
Table I, columns (4)–(9)). One can see in the figure that among
individuals with priors regarding other subjects’ planned partici-
pation below (above) the true level, there is a significantly greater
increase (decrease) in posteriors among the treatment group than
among the control group.
We next estimate regression models predicting posterior be-
liefs regarding other subjects’ actual participation as a func-
tion of treatment status, controlling for individuals’ prior beliefs
regarding others’ actual participation.36 To begin, we pool all
subjects, but we code the treatment variable as being equal to
the treatment group; such information spillovers would tend to bias estimated
effects (in both the first stage and the reduced form) toward 0.
36. In Online Appendix Table A.6 we present an alternative specification, in
which the outcome variable is a subject’s change in beliefs (posteriorsminus priors)
regarding other subjects’ actual participation. We focus on belief levels in the main
text as this specification is less restrictive on the coefficient on prior beliefs and
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FIGURE IV
Treatment Effect on Beliefs (“First Stage”)
Graph shows prior (measured June 24, 2016) and posterior (measured June 30,
2016) beliefs regarding the actual protest participation of HKUST survey partici-
pants, split according to subjects’ treatment status and according to prior beliefs
about other subjects’ planned participation. Subsamples of subjects are divided ac-
cording to whether beliefs regarding the planned protest participation of HKUST
survey participants were above or below the true level of 17%.
−1 for individuals whose prior beliefs regarding the planned
participation of other subjects were above the truth, in order to
make the treatment effect monotonic. The coding of the treat-
ment variable reflects our strong priors, as well as the evidence
presented in Figure III, that individuals in the treatment group
update their beliefs about the actual participation of others in op-
posite directions depending on whether their prior beliefs about
the planned participation of others were above or below the infor-
mation provided. One can see in Table III, Panel A, column (1),
that the experimental treatment statistically significantly moved
beliefs, by just below 6 percentage points.37
because models of protest participation typically focus on belief levels, rather than
belief changes, as the drivers of protest participation.
37. We explore alternative “switching points” for the treatment variable (i.e.,
different levels of priors above which we code treatment equal to −1) in On-
line Appendix Figure A.4. Specifically, we estimate the specification presented in
Table III, Panel A, column (1), and plot the point estimate (and 95% confidence
interval) for integer switching points from 0 to 100. One can see in the left panel
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TABLE III
TREATMENT EFFECT ON POSTERIOR BELIEFS
Posterior belief on participation Posterior belief on total participation
among HKUST students (%) among HK population (#)
Prior below Prior above Prior below Prior above
All subjects truth truth All subjects truth truth
Sample (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Baseline
Treatment 5.891*** 11,423.9*
(direction adj.) [0.567] [5,988.6]
Treatment 4.457*** −9.459*** 13,198.0** −7,013.5
[0.545] [1.413] [6,541.3] [13,108.6]
Panel B: With controls
Treatment 6.119*** 14,133.0**
(direction adj.) [0.572] [6,150.0]
Treatment 4.638*** − 10.120*** 15,086.2** − 10,936.5
[0.532] [1.452] [6,686.1] [13,747.8]
Panel C: Trimmed
Treatment 5.144*** 13,051.2**
(direction adj.) [0.555] [6,226.9]
Treatment 4.279*** −7.568*** 15,911.0** −5,050.6
[0.568] [1.371] [6,540.9] [14,994.8]
Observations 1,234 873 361 1,234 873 361
DV mean (control grp.) 14.04 8.44 28.30 139,878 128,084 169,940
DV std. dev. (control grp.) 14.10 8.46 15.54 155,482 147,528 171,162
DV mean (all) 14.50 11.40 22.02 142,684 134,454 162,586
DV std. dev. (all) 10.83 7.99 12.92 142,685 139,385 148,689
Notes. Table shows first-stage effects: the effects of the experimental treatment on subjects’ posterior beliefs
regarding others’ actual protest participation, conditional on subjects’ prior beliefs regarding others’ actual
participation. Columns (1)–(3) show effects on posterior beliefs regarding other experimental subjects’ actual
participation, and columns (4)–(6) show effects on posterior beliefs regarding the total turnout at the protest by
all Hong Kong citizens. In columns (1) and (4), all subjects are pooled and treatment is coded as−1 for subjects
whose priors regarding others’ planned participation were above the true value of 17%; pooled regressions
also control for an indicator of whether subjects’ priors regarding others’ planned participation were above
true value and its interaction with subjects’ prior beliefs regarding others’ actual participation. Columns (2)
and (5) ((3) and (6)) show effects on posterior beliefs for the subsample of subjects whose priors regarding
others’ planned participation were below (above) the true value of 17%. Panel A is estimated without any
additional controls beyond the corresponding levels of prior beliefs; Panel B replicates the analysis in Panel A
but adds controls for subjects’ background characteristics and economic status (gender, year of birth, a z-score
index measuring whether subjects were raised in a Hong Kong–oriented environment, whether subjects were
raised in a religious household, the economic status of the household, and own projected economic status);
Panel C estimates the baseline specification of Panel A excluding those individuals in the experimental sample
with the 5% lowest and the 5% highest prior beliefs regarding other subjects’ planned participation. Number
of observations refers to that in the baseline specification. *: Significant at 10%; **: 5%; ***: 1%.
Next we split the experimental sample into groups with priors
regarding planned participation above and below the true level of
planned participation of 17%. In Table III, Panel A, columns (2)
and (3), one can see statistically significant belief updating in
each subsample. Among individuals with prior beliefs regarding
planned participation of other subjects below (above) the truth,
treatment increases (decreases) beliefs regarding other subjects’
actual turnout by around 4.5 (9.5) percentage points. A test of
equality of the coefficients estimated in these columns is rejected
with p < .001.
of Online Appendix Figure A.4 that we find the strongest first-stage effects when
the coding of the treatment indicator switches at 17%.
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We explore the robustness of the first-stage estimates along
two margins in Table III. First, we examine whether controlling
for subject characteristics affects the estimated treatment effects.
One can see in Table III, Panel B, columns (1)–(3), that control-
ling for subjects’ background characteristics and economic status
(variables presented in Table I) does not meaningfully affect the
estimated treatment effects in either the pooled regression or the
split sample regressions. As a second robustness exercise, we con-
sider the possibility that our results are strongly influenced by
individuals with extreme priors; we thus drop from our sample the
5% of subjects with the lowest prior beliefs and the 5% of subjects
with the highest prior beliefs regarding the planned participation
of others. One can see in Table III, Panel C, columns (1)–(3), that
dropping individuals with extreme priors does not greatly affect
our results (though the coefficient estimated from the sample with
priors above 17% is somewhat attenuated).
An additional important consideration is whether our statis-
tical inferences based on traditional standard errors are sound.38
As an alternative, we randomly assign (fictional) treatment status
(in the same two-thirds treatment, one-third control ratio used in
the actual experiment) and estimate first-stage treatment effects
10,000 times each for the subsample of subjects with prior be-
liefs regarding others’ planned participation below 17% and the
subsample with prior beliefs regarding others’ planned partici-
pation above 17%. We can compare the t-statistics from the esti-
mated treatment effects from the fictional treatment assignments
to the t-statistics from the actual treatment assignment (the ac-
tual estimates are those in Table III, Panel A, columns (2)–(3)).
We find that our p-values using randomization inference, based on
two-sided tests, are very similar to those using standard inference
(see Figure V).
Experimental subjects who updated their beliefs regarding
other subjects’ turnout at the protest also may have updated their
beliefs regarding the turnout of Hong Kong citizens more gener-
ally. We thus next examine the effect of the treatment on sub-
jects’ beliefs regarding protest turnout among the entire Hong
Kong population. We replicate the specifications in Table III,
columns (1)–(3), but using as our outcome the posterior beliefs
regarding the total turnout in the July 1 protest of 2016 (and
38. See Deaton and Cartwright (2018) for a discussion of challenges to statis-
tical inference in randomized controlled trials.
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FIGURE V
Distribution of t-Statistics from Estimating the Treatment Effect on Posterior
Beliefs (First Stage) Based on 10,000 Random Assignments of Treatment Status
(Two-Thirds Treatment, One-Third Control) to Study Participants
Subsamples of subjects are divided according to whether beliefs regarding the
planned protest participation of HKUST survey participants were above or below
the true level of 17%. Red vertical lines indicate the t-statistics from the actual
treatment assignment (drawn at 4 and −4, rather than their true values, for ease
of visualization), with indicated p-values from two-sided tests.
controlling for prior beliefs regarding the total turnout at the
protest). In Table III, columns (4)–(6), one can see suggestive
evidence that the treatment affected beliefs regarding total
protest size in the same direction as it affected beliefs regarding
other subjects’ turnout.
IV.B. The Reduced Form: Effects on Protest Turnout
Wenow turn to examining the effects of the information treat-
ment on individuals’ own protest participation. As we did in the
analysis of the first stage, we split the experimental sample into
two groups: first, subjects whose prior beliefs regarding other sub-
jects’ planned turnout were below the truth; and second, subjects
whose prior beliefs regarding other subjects’ planned turnoutwere
above the truth. In the previous section we saw that in the former
group, the treatment increased beliefs regarding other subjects’
turnout, while in the latter group, the treatment reduced beliefs
regarding other subjects’ turnout.
In Figure VI, we present turnout levels among subjects in the
treatment and control groups in the two subsamples split accord-
ing to priors. One can see in the figure that in the subsamplewhose
priors were below the truth, the information treatment caused a
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FIGURE VI
Treatment Effect on Protest Participation (“Reduced Form”)
Graph shows self-reported participation in the July 1 protest of 2016, split ac-
cording to subjects’ treatment status and according to prior beliefs about other
subjects’ planned participation. Subsamples of subjects are divided according to
whether beliefs regarding the planned protest participation of HKUST survey
participants were above or below the true level of 17%.
statistically significant fall in turnout; in the subsample whose
priors were above the truth, the information treatment caused a
statistically significant increase in turnout. In other words, we
find evidence that the protest decision is a negative function of
beliefs regarding the turnout of others. It is worth emphasizing
that this relationship is found in independent tests on two dis-
tinct subsamples: both the subsample with prior beliefs below the
information provided and the subsample with prior beliefs above.
The protest game in this setting is one of strategic substitutes.
We next turn to regression analysis of the reduced-form rela-
tionship between treatment and protest participation. As in the
first-stage analysis, we begin by pooling all subjects, coding the
treatment variable as being equal to −1 for individuals whose
prior beliefs regarding the planned participation of other subjects
were above the truth, in order to make the treatment effect mono-
tonic. In Table IV, Panel A, column (1), one can see that the treat-
ment causes a statistically significant 2.7 percentage point change
in turnout in the opposite direction of the change in beliefs.39 In
39. As was done in the first-stage analysis, we explore alternative switching
points for the treatment variable (i.e., different levels of priors above which we code
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TABLE IV
TREATMENT EFFECT ON PROTEST PARTICIPATION
Participated in 2016 July 1 march
Prior below Prior above
All subjects truth truth
Sample (1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Baseline
Treatment − 2.713***
(direction adj.) [0.765]
Treatment −2.105* 6.373***
[1.182] [1.873]
Panel B: With controls
Treatment − 2.151**
(direction adj.) [0.913]
Treatment −2.066* 7.106***
[1.222] [2.066]
Panel C: Trimmed
Treatment − 2.467***
(direction adj.) [0.797]
Treatment −2.230* 5.711***
[1.250] [2.042]
Observations 1,234 873 361
DV mean (control grp.) 2.743 3.472 0.885
DV std. dev. (control grp.) 16.35 18.34 9.41
DV mean (all) 2.998 2.062 5.263
DV std. dev. (all) 17.06 14.22 22.36
Notes. Table shows reduced-form estimates, reporting the effects of the experimental treatment on subjects’
own protest participation. In columns (1) and (4), all subjects are pooled and treatment is coded as −1 for
subjects whose priors regarding others’ planned participation was above the true value of 17%. Columns (2)–
(3) show effects on posterior beliefs for the subsample of subjects whose priors regarding others’ planned
participation were below (above) the true value of 17%. Panel A is estimated without any controls. Panel B
replicates the analysis in Panel A but adds controls for subjects’ background characteristics and economic
status (gender, year of birth, a z-score index measuring whether subjects were raised in a Hong Kong–oriented
environment, whether subjects were raised in a religious household, the economic status of the household,
and own projected economic status), and for subjects’ prior beliefs regarding HKUST students’ planned
participation in the July 1 march. Panel C estimates the baseline specification of Panel A, but excluding
those individuals in the experimental sample with the 5% lowest and the 5% highest prior beliefs regarding
other subjects’ planned participation. Number of observations refers to that in the baseline specification.
*: Significant at 10%; **: 5%; ***: 1%.
Table IV, Panel A, columns (2) and (3), we split the experimental
sample into groups with priors regarding planned participation
above and below the true level of planned participation of 17%,
treatment equal to −1) in Online Appendix Figure A.4. Specifically, we estimate
the specification presented in Table IV, Panel A, column (1), and plot the point
estimate (and 95% confidence interval) for integer switching points from 0 to 100.
One can see in the right panel of the figure that we find the strongest reduced-form
effects when the coding of treatment switches in the range between 15% and 30%.
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FIGURE VII
Distribution of t-Statistics from Estimating the Reduced-Form Effect of
Treatment on Protest Participation Based on 10,000 Random Assignments of
Treatment Status (Two-Thirds Treatment, One-Third Control) to Study
Participants
Subsamples of subjects are divided according to whether beliefs regarding the
planned protest participation of HKUST survey participants were above or below
the true level of 17%. Red vertical lines indicate the t-statistics from the actual
treatment assignment, with indicated p-values from two-sided tests.
and find significant effects in each subsample, matching the re-
sults shown in Figure VI (a test of equality of the coefficients
estimated in Table IV, Panel A, columns (2) and (3) is rejected
with p < .001).
As in the first-stage analysis, we address concerns about
statistical inferences based on traditional standard errors in
our study of the reduced-form effects. We again use randomiza-
tion inference as an alternative, randomly assigning (fictional)
treatment status and estimating reduced-form treatment effects
10,000 times each for the subsample of subjects with prior beliefs
regarding others’ planned participation below 17% and the sub-
sample with prior beliefs regarding others’ planned participation
above 17%. We then compare the t-statistics from the estimated
treatment effects from the fictional treatment assignments to the
t-statistics from the actual treatment assignment (the actual es-
timates are those in Table IV, Panel A, columns (2) and (3)). We
again find that our p-values using randomization inference, based
on two-sided tests, are very similar to those using standard infer-
ence (see Figure VII).
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The estimated reduced-form treatment effects in Table IV,
Panel A, are not only statistically significant but also indicate a
substantively significant effect of the information treatment on
political behavior. One can see this by comparing the variation
in protest participation explained by the treatment to the vari-
ation explained by the rich set of additional individual covari-
ates we collected in Part 1 of the experiment. In Online Appendix
Table A.7, one can see that the treatment actually has greater
explanatory power than economic preferences, personality traits,
cognitive ability, background characteristics, or economic status.
The magnitude of the treatment effect can also be bench-
marked against estimated political mobilization effects in the
existing literature in economics and political science. We follow
DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2010) in calculating the persuasion
rate implied by our treatment: the fraction of individuals who
participate in the protest when treated but who would not have
turned out to protest in the absence of the treatment. Among the
subsample of individuals with priors above the information we
provided—whom the treatment moved in the direction of greater
participation—we find a persuasion rate of 6.43%. DellaVigna and
Gentzkow (2010) calculate persuasion rates for seven interven-
tions that stimulate turnout, from get-out-the-vote campaigns to
media content; our treatment, though it did not directly encour-
age protest turnout, has effects that exceedmost of the impersonal
persuasive messages, for example, TV content or mass mailings
encouraging voter turnout.40
In Table IV, Panels B and C, we conduct robustness exer-
cises analogous to those considered in the first-stage analysis.
One can see that neither including controls for subjects’ prior
beliefs regarding other subjects’ planned participation, subjects’
background characteristics, and economic status (Panel B) nor
trimming the 5% of subjects with the lowest and the 5% of sub-
jects with the highest prior beliefs regarding planned participa-
tion (Panel C), greatly affects the estimated reduced-form treat-
ment effects.
40. The information treatment is not as effective as more personal interven-
tions (e.g., door-to-door canvassing). For comparison, the findings in Gerber and
Green (2000) imply persuasion rates of 1% for impersonal get-out-the-vote mail-
ings and 15.6% for door-to-door visits. The magnitude of the treatment effect is
sensible given the nature of our interactions with the students in our sample: our
repeated interactions were more personal than a mass mailing or mass media
campaign, but were less personal than a face-to-face interaction.
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We explore two more dimensions of robustness in Online
Appendix Table A.8. First, we consider sample restrictions de-
pending on subjects’ own plans to participate in the July 1 march.
One might believe that individuals who reported, without any
uncertainty, a plan not to attend the march (in Part 1 of the ex-
periment) would be unlikely to have had their protest decision
affected on the margin by the experimental treatment. Consis-
tent with this expectation, dropping this group from our analysis
results in larger estimated treatment effects than in the base-
line specification. In contrast, one might expect individuals who
reported, without any uncertainty, a plan to attend the march
would most likely be closer to the margin—either confirmed in
their plans or deterred from them by the information treatment.
Consistent with this logic, when we drop subjects who planned
to attend the march, we find attenuated (though still statistically
significant) treatment effects. A second exercise considers an al-
ternative construction of the outcome variable: an indicator of a
change from plans in Part 1 of the experiment (no certain plan
to attend) to behavior in Part 3 (actual attendance at the march).
We find qualitatively similar results when we consider “changed
plans” as the outcome variable.
We next examine heterogeneity in the reduced-form treat-
ment effect associated with subjects’ priors regarding the planned
participation of others. In Figure III one could see that the largest
first-stage effects were produced among individuals with prior be-
liefs far from the information provided by the experimental treat-
ment. We assess whether the largest reduced-form effects are also
seen among those subjects whose prior beliefs were far from the
true level of 17%. To do so, we regress protest participation on the
interaction between a treatment group dummy variable and 5-
percentage-point bins of priors regarding other subjects’ planned
participation (as well as lower-order terms). In Figure VIII, one
can see the estimated coefficients on the interaction terms and
their 95% confidence intervals. The effect of the treatment on
protest turnout was, indeed, greatest among individuals whose
priors were furthest from the information provided. These find-
ings provide reassuring evidence of consistency between the first-
stage effects and the reduced form.41
41. A less parametric analysis of heterogeneity in the treatment effect associ-
ated with subjects’ priors—locally weighted regression estimates of the treatment
effect across subjects’ priors—can be seen in Online Appendix Figure A.5. The
patterns are broadly similar to those in Figure VIII.
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FIGURE VIII
Treatment Effect on Protest Participation (Reduced Form), Disaggregated by
Prior Beliefs Regarding the Planned Participation of HKUST Survey
Participants (Bins Are Five Percentage Points Wide)
Of course, the variation across subjects in their prior beliefs
regarding others’ planned participation is not experimentally in-
duced, and is correlated with other variables that also shape the
decision to protest (recall that predictors of prior beliefs can be
seen in Online Appendix Table A.5). We next explore the extent to
which variation in individual characteristics—rather than vari-
ation in prior beliefs—is likely to be behind the heterogeneous
treatment effects observed in Figures III and VIII. We begin, in
Table V, Panel A, column (1), by estimating a linear model of
heterogeneous first-stage treatment effects associated with sub-
jects’ prior beliefs regarding other subjects’ planned participation
(roughly, fitting a line through Figure III). As expected, we es-
timate a significant, positive y-intercept and a significant, nega-
tive coefficient on the interaction between the treatment dummy
and prior beliefs. In Table V, Panel B, column (1), we estimate
a linear model of heterogeneous reduced-form treatment effects
associated with subjects’ prior beliefs regarding other subjects’
planned participation (roughly, fitting a line through Figure VIII).
As expected, we estimate a significant, negative y-intercept and
a significant, positive coefficient on the interaction between the
treatment dummy and prior beliefs.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/qje/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/qje/qjz002/5298503 by London School of Econom
ics user on 21 M
arch 2019
38 THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
TABLE V
HETEROGENEOUS TREATMENT EFFECTS BY PRIOR BELIEFS
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Treatment effect on posterior beliefs (first stage)
Treatment 7.417*** 3.635 7.206***
[0.827] [3.314] [2.311]
Treatment × prior beliefs −0.430***
[0.059]
Treatment × predicted prior beliefs − 0.204 −0.419***
[0.211] [0.153]
Treatment × residual prior beliefs −0.441***
[0.062]
Panel B: Treatment effect on protest participation (reduced form)
Treatment −4.112*** −10.970** −11.140**
[1.444] [4.822] [4.679]
Treatment × prior beliefs 0.284***
[0.068]
Treatment × predicted prior beliefs 0.691** 0.701**
[0.341] [0.331]
Treatment × residual prior beliefs 0.246***
[0.068]
Observations 1,234 1,176 1,176
1st stage DV mean (control grp.) 14.04 14.10 14.10
1st stage DV std. dev. (control grp.) 14.10 14.24 14.24
1st stage DV mean (all) 14.50 14.50 14.50
1st stage DV std. dev. (all) 10.83 10.85 10.85
2nd stage DV mean (control grp.) 2.743 2.880 2.880
2nd stage DV std. dev. (control grp.) 16.35 16.75 16.75
2nd stage DV mean (all) 2.998 2.976 2.976
2nd stage DV std. dev. (all) 17.06 17.00 17.00
Notes. Table shows first-stage (Panel A) and reduced-form (Panel B) estimates, reporting the effects of
the experimental treatment on subjects’ posterior beliefs about others’ participation and on subjects’ own
protest participation. In column (1), the model allows treatment effects to vary with subjects’ prior beliefs
regarding the planned protest participation of other experimental subjects. In column (2), the model allows
treatment effects to vary with subjects’ predicted prior beliefs based on observables (the predicted levels of
priors regarding others’ planned participation are estimated using a linear model including all 47 factors
listed in Online Appendix Table A.5). In column (3), the model allows treatment effects to vary with subjects’
residual prior beliefs, the component of beliefs not predicted by observables, as well as with subjects’ predicted
priors. All regressions include the relevant lower-order term for prior beliefs. *: Significant at 10%; **: 5%;
***: 1%.
We exploit our rich information about subjects to predict
their priors using a linear model including all 47 factors listed in
Online Appendix Table A.5. These predicted priors represent
“problematic” variation in beliefs: heterogeneity in treatment ef-
fects associated with predicted priors may be driven by subjects’
observable characteristics rather than by beliefs. Having calcu-
lated predicted priors for each individual, we are left with their
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residual priors—the component of prior beliefs unexplained by
the large set of observable characteristics.42 In Table V, Panels A
and B, column (2), we estimate linear models of heterogeneous
first-stage and reduced-form treatment effects associated with
subjects’ predicted prior beliefs; these estimates are of the same
sign as but somewhat less precise than estimates using actual
priors. In Table V, Panels A and B, column (3), we estimate linear
models of heterogeneous first-stage and reduced-form treatment
effects associated with both subjects’ predicted prior beliefs and
residual priors. One can see that while there exists statistically
significant heterogeneity in the treatment effect associated with
the “problematic” variation in predicted priors, there also exists
statistically significant heterogeneity in the treatment effect as-
sociated with just the residual priors. This provides reassurance
that the heterogeneous treatment effects we observe are indeed
driven by variation in beliefs.
IV.C. Two-Stage Estimates: The Effects of Beliefs on Turnout
Thus far we have shown that providing information regarding
the true level of planned protest turnout among our experimental
sample caused (i) beliefs regarding actual turnout to change; and
(ii) subjects’ own turnout to change, with beliefs and turnout mov-
ing in opposite directions. We combine the two effects—first stage
and reduced form—in a two-stage analysis that allows us to esti-
mate the effect of beliefs regarding others’ turnout on one’s own
turnout. It is worth emphasizing that one should not interpret the
two-stage estimates too literally: we have already shown that the
information treatment affected beliefs regarding the turnout of
other experimental subjects and Hong Kong citizens more gener-
ally, so we cannot estimate the “pure” causal effect of a 1 percent-
age point change in beliefs regarding other subjects’ turnout.43
42. Note that it is not the case that heterogeneity in treatment effects as-
sociated with predicted priors is necessarily driven by observables, rather than
by beliefs, but simply that this cannot be ruled out. Note, too, that heterogeneity
in treatment effects associated with residual priors is not necessarily driven by
beliefs alone, as it might be driven by unobserved characteristics. Our rich data
collection makes the latter less of a concern but does not eliminate it.
43. Another important reference population whose turnout might affect sub-
jects’ own is subjects’ close friends. Although we do not observe prior and posterior
beliefs regarding close friends’ turnout, it is worth noting that we do not expect
these beliefs to have been affected by our experimental intervention: students
likely knew well whether their close friends would attend the July 1 march
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With this caveat in mind, we still believe this exercise is instruc-
tive. Specifically, we predict individuals’ protest turnout using
their posterior beliefs regarding other experimental subjects’ ac-
tual participation, instrumenting for the latter with the treatment
dummy (when examining the pooled sample, we instrument for
posteriors setting the treatment equal to −1 for individuals with
prior beliefs regarding the planned participation of others greater
than 17%).
We begin by estimating the two-stage model using the pooled
sample, controlling only for subjects’ prior beliefs regarding other
subjects’ actual turnout. In Table VI, Panel A, column (1), one
can see that we estimate just over a 0.5 percentage point de-
crease in one’s own turnout for every 1 percentage point in-
crease in one’s posterior beliefs regarding the turnout of others. In
Table VI, Panel A, columns (2)–(3), we split the experimental sam-
ple into groups with priors regarding planned participation above
and below the true level of planned participation of 17%, and
find significant effects in each subsample. It is worth noting that
although we had found larger first-stage and reduced-form treat-
ment effects in the subsample with priors above 17% (see Tables
III and IV), in Table VI, Panel A, columns (2) and (3), we find
very similar estimated effects of beliefs about others’ turnout on
one’s own turnout in the two subsamples—around a 0.5 percent-
age point effect (a test of equality of the coefficients estimated in
Table VI, Panel A, columns (2) and (3), fails to reject the null, with
p = .585).
In Table VI, Panels B and C, we conduct robustness exer-
cises analogous to those considered in the first-stage and reduced-
form analyses above. One can see that neither including con-
trols for subjects’ background characteristics and economic status
(Panel B), nor trimming the 5% of subjects with the lowest and the
5% of subjects with the highest prior beliefs regarding planned
participation (Panel C), greatly affects the estimated effects of
regardless of their treatment status. We explore heterogeneity in the first-stage
and reduced-form treatment effects depending on whether subjects reported in
Part 1 the expectation that a close friend would participate. We find that first-
stage treatment effects are not significantly different depending on close friends’
attendance, but the reduced-form treatment effects are larger among individuals’
who expected a close friend to attend (see Online Appendix Table A.9). This reflects
the fact that individuals on the margin of attendance (and so more responsive to
the treatment) were differentially those who expected their friends to attend the
July 1 march as well.
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TABLE VI
TWO-STAGE ESTIMATES OF PROTEST PARTICIPATION
Participated in 2016 July 1 march
Prior below Prior above
Sample All subjects truth truth
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Baseline
Posterior belief −0.553*** −0.468** −0.654**
[0.177] [0.236] [0.264]
Panel B: With controls
Posterior belief −0.554*** −0.447* −0.660***
[0.175] [0.231] [0.254]
Panel C: Trimmed
Posterior belief −0.607*** −0.514** −0.754**
[0.212] [0.261] [0.354]
Observations 1,234 873 361
1st stage DV mean (control grp.) 14.04 8.44 28.30
1st stage DV std. dev. (control grp.) 14.10 8.46 15.54
1st stage DV mean (all) 14.50 11.40 22.02
1st stage DV std. dev. (all) 10.83 7.99 12.92
2nd stage DV mean (control grp.) 2.743 3.472 0.885
2nd stage DV std. dev. (control grp.) 16.35 18.34 9.41
2nd stage DV mean (all) 2.998 2.062 5.263
2nd stage DV std. dev. (all) 17.06 14.22 22.36
Notes. Table shows two-stage estimates of the effects of beliefs about other subjects’ turnout in the protest
on one’s own turnout. The first stage estimates the effects of the experimental treatment on subjects’ pos-
terior beliefs regarding other subjects’ actual protest participation, conditional on the corresponding prior
beliefs. The second stage exploits variation in beliefs regarding other subjects’ participation induced by the
experimental treatment to estimate the effect of beliefs about others’ protest turnout on one’s own turnout.
In column (1), all subjects are pooled and treatment is coded as −1 for subjects whose priors regarding others’
planned participation were above the true value of 17%; pooled regression also controls for an indicator of
whether subjects’ priors regarding others’ planned participation were above true value and its interaction
with subjects’ prior beliefs regarding others’ actual participation. Columns (2)–(3) show estimates for the
subsample of subjects whose priors regarding others’ planned participation were below (above) the true value
of 17%. Panel A is estimated without any controls beyond the corresponding prior beliefs. Panel B repli-
cates the analysis in Panel A but adds controls for subjects’ background characteristics and economic status
(gender, year of birth, a z-score index measuring whether subjects were raised in a Hong Kong–oriented
environment, whether subjects were raised in a religious household, the economic status of the household,
and own projected economic status). Panel C estimates the baseline specification of Panel A, but excluding
those individuals in the experimental sample with the 5% lowest and the 5% highest prior beliefs regarding
other subjects’ planned participation. Number of observations refers to that in the baseline specification. *:
Significant at 10%; **: 5%; ***: 1%.
beliefs on protest turnout. Finally, in Online Appendix Table A.10,
we replicate Table VI, but consider belief changes, rather than
levels, as the endogenous regressor of interest (for which we use
the treatment dummy as an instrument). We find similar results
using this alternative specification.
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IV.D. Internal Validity
We address several concerns regarding the internal validity
of our estimates. First, as noted, we found that our treatment
and control groups were unbalanced at the 5% level on 6 of 47
subject characteristics elicited in Part 1 (summary statistics for
these variables and t-tests of equality ofmeans between treatment
and control groups are presented in Online Appendix Table A.1).
To determine whether observable differences between treatment
and control groups might drive our results, we estimate our base-
line first-stage and reduced-form specifications (shown in Table
III, Panel A, column (1) and Table IV, Panel A, column (1), re-
spectively; replicated in Online Appendix Table A.2, column (1)),
but controlling for the interaction between each unbalanced char-
acteristic and the treatment dummy. One can see in Online
Appendix Table A.2, columns (2)–(9), that controlling for these
interactions leaves our treatment effect estimates practically un-
affected.
A second concern is that selective attrition between Part 1
of our experiment and Part 3 might affect our estimates (though
our finding of insignificant differences between the Part 1 sam-
ple’s characteristics and the Part 3 sample’s, in Online Appendix
Table A.3, is reassuring). To address concerns about selective
attrition, we reweight the sample of individuals who completed
Part 3 to match the sample of individuals who completed Part
1 (but not necessarily the rest) of the study. We match the Part
1 sample on subjects’ gender, birth year, childhood environment,
religiosity, household income, and economic status. In Online Ap-
pendix Table A.11, one can see that our estimated first-stage and
reduced-form treatment effects are largely unaffected by this
reweighting exercise.44
Another possibility is that information regarding other sub-
jects’ protest plans not only affected beliefs about others’ par-
ticipation but also affected beliefs about the political movement
44. In Online Appendix Table A.11, we replicate our main results, but weight-
ing observations to match the HKUST student population. We again find that our
results are essentially unchanged. It is important to note that our reweighting
exercises can only provide evidence of similar observable characteristics between
our experimental sample and the reference samples: the HKUST student popu-
lation or the sample of individuals who completed Part 1 of the study. We cannot
rule out unobservable differences between these groups, though the similarity of
observable characteristics is reassuring.
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itself—as if the protest were a consumption good with uncertain
quality. However, in this case, the standard social learning logic
would suggest that positive updating of beliefs regarding the num-
ber of other subjects joining a protest should lead students to up-
date positively about protest “quality.” This would produce the
appearance of strategic complementarity, not the strategic substi-
tutability that we observe.
Standard experimenter demand effects would likely produce
the appearance of strategic complementarity—when the exper-
imenter tells a subject that a behavior is more prevalent than
the subject expected, the subject seems likely to assume that
the experimenter is trying to induce that behavior, and thus be
more likely to report it. Further arguing against experimenter
demand effects (or other unintended consequences of the exper-
imental treatment) driving our findings, we also find evidence
consistent with strategic substitutability in the protest decision
even in the absence of any experimental treatment. Simply exam-
ining naturally occurring variation in beliefs among our control
group subjects, one sees a negative relationship between poste-
rior beliefs regarding the actual participation of others and sub-
jects’ own participation in the July 1 march (see Online Appendix
Figure A.6).45
V. DISCUSSION
Our experiment estimates the causal effect of beliefs about
others’ protest participation on one’s own, exploiting variation in
beliefs driven by a specific level of planned turnout, from a sin-
gle protest, in a particular setting. One naturally wonders how to
generalize from such an estimate. In Section II.B, we discussed
several important dimensions along which Hong Kong’s July 1
marches share similarities with other antiauthoritarian protests:
45. We also observe a negative relationship between subjects’ self-reported
past protest participation and their beliefs about other subjects’ support for the
antiauthoritarianmovement, in responses recorded in Part 1 (see Online Appendix
Figure A.7). It is important to emphasize that, while suggestive, the correlations
observed inOnlineAppendix FiguresA.6 andA.7must be interpretedwith caution.
Among other concerns, the levels of posterior beliefs in the control group are quite
strongly correlated with their accuracy, and subjects with more accurate beliefs
may turn out more than others for reasons other than strategic considerations.
Past protest participation may shape beliefs about others’ ideology, in addition to
being shaped by them.
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as in other protests, the Hong Kong marches aim to achieve con-
crete political changes bymobilizing large numbers of individuals,
with these individuals facing a potential government crackdown.
Thus, on its face, there is reason to expect that protest behavior
in the July 1 march will have some degree of external validity to
other antiauthoritarian protests.
Yet it must be acknowledged that even in the same context
we study, even in the specific protest we study, it is possible that
at a different level of protest participation the causal effect of
beliefs about others’ turnout on one’s own could differ—indeed,
it may even flip signs. Given the possible heterogeneity in the
treatment effect we estimate, an important question is to what
extent does our single empirical parameter estimate bound the
set of theoretical models of protest participation?
Although our estimate does not pin down a single model of
protest participation, we argue that it does provide important
bounds on the set of models consistent with our estimate: much
recent theoretical work on protest participation assumes only the
possibility of strategic complementarity in the protest decision.
This assumption has become so widespread that we treat it as
a “benchmark” model in what follows. Our findings reject this
benchmark model. Although we cannot claim that a specific alter-
native model produces our findings of strategic substitutability,
we provide evidence consistent with three plausible mechanisms
that could generate strategic substitutability in our setting and
could easily be incorporated into the benchmark model to allow
for the strategic substitutability that we find.
V.A. The Benchmark Model
The recent political economy literature has typically modeled
protest participation as a global game (or similar), with the stage
game featuring strategic complementarity, and by assumption rul-
ing out the possibility of strategic substitutes. Here we present a
simple, but general, version of the “benchmark” model of the stage
game and relate it to several recent articles that emphasize dif-
ferent underlying sources of strategic complementarity.
In the benchmark model, individual i’s utility from protest
participation can be written as follows:
Ui = 1Pi=1(Vi(P−i, S(P−i))− Ci(P−i, S(P−i))),
where 1Pi=1 is an indicator that individual i participated in the
protest and the utility from participating (Ui) is a function of the
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benefits from participation (Vi) and the costs (Ci). Costs and ben-
efits, in turn, are assumed to depend directly on the participation
of other individuals (the level of which is denoted P−i), as well as
on the success of a protest (an indicator denoted S), which itself
may depend on the participation of others.
The benchmark model first follows the recent literature in
assuming that protests are more likely to succeed when they are
larger and that individuals derive differential utility from partici-
pating in protests that succeed (or that aremore likely to succeed).
Bueno de Mesquita (2010, 449), for example, assumes that “there
is some portion ... of the payoffs from regime change that can
only be accessed by those who participate ... Substantively, this
could be because those who actively participate in revolution gain
privileged status after regime change occurs or because there are
expressive benefits to having participated in a victorious upris-
ing.” Edmond (2013, 1425) writes simply that “the more citizens
participate in [a protest], the more likely it is that the regime is
overthrown and so the more likely it is that any individual also
participates.” Passarelli and Tabellini (2017, 910) write that indi-
viduals may derive greater utility from the “feeling of contributing
to a more meaningful event with a greater chance of success.”
Barbera` and Jackson (2018, 7–8) assume that individuals at-
tain utility “from knowing or being able to say that they partici-
pated in a revolution that was successful: from having been one
of those who stormed the Bastille, participated in the Salt March,
or protests in Tunisia, etc.”
Formally, the benchmark model assumes:
∂S
∂P−i
> 0 and
∂V
∂S
> 0.
It is worth noting that the crucial assumption that a protest is
perceived to be more likely to succeed when more people turn out
(i.e., ∂S
∂P−i
> 0) receives empirical support in our experimental con-
text. We elicit experimental subjects’ beliefs about the likelihood
that a Hong Kong prodemocracy protest would succeed as a func-
tion of protest turnout and find that these are strongly increasing
(see Figure I).
The benchmark model also assumes that the benefits from
participating in a protest are larger when it is attended by more
people—even if the increased participation does not affect the
protest’s success. This may be, for example, because participation
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in a larger protest increases the expressive utility a participant
attains. In amodel of citizen unrest in response to perceived unfair
government policy, Passarelli and Tabellini (2017, 910) write that
“the psychological benefit of a public display of anger is stronger
if the emotion is more widely shared.”
Thus, whether because of direct effects or because of indirect
effects working through protest success, the benchmark model
assumes that the benefits of protest attendance increase with the
attendance of others—thus generating strategic complementarity.
Formally:
dV
d P−i
> 0.
The benchmark model assumes similar effects of others’
turnout arising from the costs side. The cost of protest attendance
may be lower when protests are successful—perhaps because in a
successful protest the regime concedes, rather than cracks down.
If, as assumed above, protest success is an increasing function of
turnout, then greater turnout will lower protest costs, alongside
increasing benefits. The cost of attendance may also be falling in
protest size independent of success if costs per person are lower
in a larger crowd. For example, Passarelli and Tabellini (2017,
910) write that “[strategic] complementarity could also be on the
cost side: the probability of being arrested is smaller in a larger
crowd.”
Thus, the benchmark model assumes:
∂C
∂S
< 0.
This assumption, alongwith the above assumption that ∂S
∂P−i
>
0, as well as direct reductions of costs arising from larger turnout,
imply another force generating strategic complementarity:
dC
d P−i
< 0.
In sum, the benchmark model—synthesizing several re-
cent articles—allows for different underlying sources of strategic
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complementarity.46 All of these generate a common prediction: if
an individual believes that the turnout of others will be greater,
she is unambiguously more likely to turn out to a protest herself.
V.B. Sources of Strategic Substitutability in the Protest Decision
Our findings reject the benchmark model of protest turnout
that assumes only the possibility of strategic complementarity in
the decision to protest. It is important to emphasize that we do
not claim that protests are always games of strategic substitutes,
but that models of protest turnout must allow for the possibility
of strategic substitutability. We propose adding to the benchmark
model’s stage game utility function a term that allows for strategic
substitutability: specifically, a term whose first derivative with
respect to protest size is negative, at least over some range.
While we cannot conclusively identify specific mechanisms
that produce the pattern of strategic substitutability we observe,
we are able to provide suggestive evidence of three plausible
drivers: first, that protests produce a public good from attain-
ing a threshold level of participation; second, that an individual’s
expected costs of protest turnout increase with protest size; and
third, that an individual’s benefits from signaling her antiauthor-
itarian type decrease with protest size.
1. Threshold Public Goods as a Function of Turnout. As de-
scribed above, the benchmark model assumed dVd P−i > 0, arising
from several sources of differential utility experienced when par-
ticipating in larger, more successful protests. However, there may
be benefits from one’s own protest turnout that over some range
are decreasing in the turnout of others. A classic argument in
the political economy literature (Olson 1965; Tullock 1971; Pal-
frey and Rosenthal 1984) is that protest participation produces
a political public good. This good might be tangible: attaining
a sufficient turnout level might send the regime a signal that
directly affects policy (for example, in the 2017 march, signifi-
cant turnout might have persuaded Leung not to run for a second
term as chief executive). The public good produced by a protest
might also be symbolic: sufficient turnout might signal the exis-
tence of a “critical mass” of protesters, which sustains the political
46. This literature (Bueno de Mesquita 2010; Edmond 2013; Barbera` and
Jackson 2018; Passarelli and Tabellini 2017) is discussed in more detail in
Online Appendix B.
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movement; note that this signal is not inconsequential, as it
shapes subsequent protest turnout in the political movement.47
We find evidence consistent with protest turnout being a pub-
lic good in our setting.We construct an index of subjects’ prosocial-
ity (altruism and reciprocity) using their responses in Part 1 of the
study. We find that this prosociality index is significantly corre-
lated with protest turnout unconditionally, as well as conditional
on treatment status, posterior beliefs about others’ turnout, and
on subjects’ own antiauthoritarian ideology (see Online Appendix
Table A.12). This is consistent with a theoretical and empirical
literature linking prosociality to public goods contributions (see,
e.g., Croson 2007).
We can incorporate the production of a public good—either
an intermediate, tangible public good (something meaningful but
short of democratization) or a symbolic public good—from suffi-
cient protest turnout into our model by adding a term, φ(P−i), to
the benefits function:
Vi = Vi(S(P−i), φ(P−i)).
In this case, the benefits from turnout are a function of (i)
the success of the protest (i.e., achieving democratization) S(P−i),
which is monotonically increasing in P−i and will tend to produce
strategic complementarity; and (ii) the production of an interme-
diate tangible public good or a symbolic public good φ(P−i), which
could be increasing in P−i over some range (i.e., below the level at
which the public good is completely produced), but decreasing in
P−i around the point at which individuals believe their turnout is
no longer needed to produce the public good.
Over some range, particularly in a protest in which the pro-
duction of the public good (e.g., signaling themovement’s strength)
is more relevant than the achievement of the ultimate success of
the movement (e.g., achieving democratization), the production
of a public good from protest participation may generate strate-
gic substitutability.48 Thus, in this case, dVd P−i may be positive or
negative, thus allowing for strategic complementarity or substi-
tutability.
47. Barbera` and Jackson (2018) present a model in which protest turnout in
one period affects beliefs about eventual movement success, and thus turnout in
subsequent periods.
48. Note that a public goods game may not be a game of strategic substitutes
in all settings: subjects may play a strategy of conditional cooperation, which
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2. Increasing Costs as Turnout Rises. The benchmark model
assumed that an individual’s expected cost of protest attendance
was falling with the expected turnout of others. The logic was that
the costs of a government crackdown would be diffused across
more people, thus reducing an individual’s own cost. However,
this logic ignores the possibility that the likelihood of a govern-
ment crackdown is increasing in protest size, at least over some
range. Consistent with this proposed mechanism behind strategic
substitutability in our setting, one can see in Figure I that our
experimental subjects believe that a government crackdown is an
increasing function of protest size.
This source of strategic substitutability can easily be
incorporated into the benchmark model. Suppose the cost of
turnout is a function of (i) the cost borne by a protester conditional
on crackdown, ci(P−i); (ii) the success of the protest, S(P−i); and
(iii) the probability of crackdown, π (P−i). Then, the cost function
would be:
Ci = Ci(π (P−i)× ci(P−i), S(P−i)),
with ∂ci
∂P−i
< 0 (following the logic of the benchmarkmodel), ∂S
∂P−i
> 0
(again, following the benchmarkmodel), and ∂π
∂P−i
> 0. In this case,
dC
d P−i
may be positive or negative, allowing for strategic comple-
mentarity or substitutability.
3. Decreasing Signaling Value of Participation as Turnout
Rises. We finally propose an additional element of the bene-
fits of protest participation, which may be greater when partic-
ipating in smaller protests: if one cares about signaling one’s
antiauthoritarian type, the value of that signal, θ i(P−i), may be
decreasing in protest size, at least over some range.49
generates strategic complementarity (see, e.g., Fischbacher, Ga¨chter, and Fehr
2001).
49. We follow the logic of Be´nabou and Tirole (2011), who present a model
in which an individual trades off honor from taking a costly, meritorious action
against stigma from not taking that action. When fewer individuals undertake the
costly action, it increases the honor associated with taking the action (because the
signal of one’s type conditional on taking the action becomes more positive), but
also reduces the stigma associated with not taking the action (because the signal
of one’s type conditional on not taking the action becomes less negative). Under a
small set of assumptions, the honor associated with taking a less common action
increases more than the stigma from not taking the action falls when the base rate
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We find several pieces of suggestive evidence consistent with
individuals’ protest participation being shaped by their political
identities (i.e., types), and the signaling of those identities. First,
we find that students’ antiauthoritarian identities (self-reported
and revealed in incentivized lab experiments) are strongly associ-
ated with their protest participation plans (see Online Appendix
Table A.5). In a subsequent survey of participants in the July 1,
2017 march in which we directly asked protest participants why
they attended the march, 45% of participants responded, “Being
politically active is an important component of my identity.”50
If subjects selected into smaller protests in response to the
perceived signaling value, one would expect individuals with very
antiauthoritarian friends—to whom signaling one’s type would
be especially valuable—to have differentially attended the July 1
march after updating their beliefs about total protest size down-
ward. Analogously, one would expect that individuals who attend
a protest specifically to signal their type to their antiauthoritar-
ian friends might select out of attendance after updating their
beliefs about total protest size upward. Consistent with this pre-
diction, we find that treatment group protest participants with
high priors regarding other subjects’ planned participation—a
group who turned out to protest after updating their beliefs re-
garding protest turnout downward—have more antiauthoritarian
friends than protest participants in the control group (see Online
Appendix Figure A.8). We find analogous results among indi-
viduals selecting out of protests when updating their beliefs
about turnout upward. This suggests that subjects who had the
strongest social-image reasons to signal their antiauthoritarian
identities differentially selected into protests they believed would
of taking the action is rare. The logic is as follows: when a meritorious action is
taken by a small minority in the tail of a distribution, the conditional meanmoving
further into the tail changes more in the minority tail of the distribution than in
the majority. This model produces strategic substitutes in taking the meritorious
action when starting from a low base, but strategic complements when starting
from a high base. Enikolopov et al. (2018) present a dynamic model in which
social-image considerations motivate persistent protest participation over time.
50. The participants in the 2017 survey included some individuals surveyed as
part of our experiment conducted in 2016 aswell as additional respondents. Among
the 2017 survey sample, we directly elicited all 59 protest participants’ reasons
for attending the 2017 march. Individuals’ identity was the second most frequent
response, with 27 individuals reporting it. The most frequent response was, “I
believed the march would produce political change,” reported by 28 individuals.
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be smaller and selected out of protests they believed would be
larger.
We can incorporate the signaling value of protest attendance
into a benefits function alongside a threshold public good. Suppose
the benefits from turnout are a function of (i) the success of the
protest, S(P−i), discussed above; (ii) the production of a public
good, φ(P−i), also discussed above; and (iii) the value of the signal
of one’s type, θ i(P−i). Then, the benefits function would be:
Vi = Vi(S(P−i), φ(P−i), θi(P−i)),
with ∂V
∂S > 0 (as in the benchmark model),
∂φ
∂P−i
< 0 (over some
range), and ∂θ
∂P−i
< 0 (when P−i is small enough). In this case, dVd P−i
may be positive or negative, again allowing for strategic comple-
mentarity or substitutability.
Thus, while only suggestive, the patterns in our data are con-
sistent with plausible mechanisms underlying strategic substi-
tutability in our setting. Importantly, these mechanisms can eas-
ily be incorporated into the benchmark model to allow for either
strategic complementarity or substitutability in the protest deci-
sion, making it consistent with our main findings.51
VI. CONCLUSION
According to the human rights organization Freedom House,
as of 2016, 26% of the world’s population—nearly two billion
people—live in states classified as “not free.” Recent protests from
the Arab Spring to Russia or Venezuela provide reminders that
citizens of unfree states today, as in the past, continually rise up
51. There exist other potential mechanisms that could generate strategic sub-
stitutability for which we do not find evidence in our setting (though they may be
present in other protests). Shadmehr and Bernhardt (2011) propose a model in
which moderates update their beliefs about the gains from protest negatively if
they believe other agents’ thresholds for turnout are too low. Thismakesmoderates
select out of protesting when they update their beliefs positively—the opposite of
what we find in Online Appendix Figure A.8. Myatt (2017) proposes a model in
which protest voters may moderate their expression if they believe that extrem-
ists are too popular. Again, this model would suggest that moderates select out
of protests when they update their beliefs positively, in contrast to our findings.
Finally, Shadmehr (2018) proposes protester perceptions of pivotality as potential
drivers of strategic substitutability; we did not ask subjects about these percep-
tions.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/qje/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/qje/qjz002/5298503 by London School of Econom
ics user on 21 M
arch 2019
52 THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
and demand political rights.52 Given the prevalence of authoritar-
ian regimes, it is important to understand individuals’ decisions
to participate in such protest movements.53
We conduct an experiment to study one dimension of indi-
viduals’ protest decision: how one’s turnout is affected by beliefs
about the turnout of others.We find consistent evidence indicating
that Hong Kong students considering participation in the July 1
protest of 2016 viewed the strategic element of their decision as a
game of strategic substitutes. Individuals in our sample who were
induced by the experiment to positively update their beliefs about
others’ turnout became less likely to participate themselves; indi-
viduals who were induced by the experiment to negatively update
their beliefs about others’ turnout became more likely to partici-
pate themselves. Although our finding of strategic substitutabil-
ity in the protest decision is estimated from a particular context,
the result provides guidance regarding models of protest turnout:
specifically, our findings reject many recent models that assume
only the possibility of strategic complementarity in the protest
decision.
While shedding light on individuals’ decisions to participate
in an antiauthoritarian protest, our experiment raises the ques-
tion: how general is our finding of strategic substitutability likely
to be? It is important to emphasize that the mechanisms we ob-
serve at work in Hong Kong will not all be present in all protests,
and even if they are present, they will not always outweigh forces
generating strategic complementarity emphasized in other work.
Among the mechanisms we highlight, we believe that the ex-
istence of a political public good produced from attaining a thresh-
old level of participation is likely to be particularly important in
52. Data come from Freedom House’s (2016) “Freedom in the World” re-
port, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FH_FITW_Report_2016.pdf, ac-
cessed August 5, 2016.
53. Research on authoritarian regimes, movements opposed to them, and
the consequences of constraints on rulers typically considers aggregate behavior,
rather than individual behavior, as we do. A large literature has studied the con-
sequences of political constraints for economic growth (e.g., DeLong and Shleifer
1993; Przeworski and Limongi 1993; Przeworski et al. 2000; Gerring et al. 2005;
Rodrik and Wacziarg 2005; Persson and Tabellini 2006, 2008; Papaioannou and
Siourounis 2008; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Bates, Fayad, and Hoeffler 2012;
Meyersson 2016; Acemoglu et al. 2015). Relatedly, a growing theoretical and empir-
ical literature studies the extension of the franchise (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson
2000, 2006; Lizzeri and Persico 2004; Llavador and Oxoby 2005; Aidt and Franck
2012, 2015).
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long-lasting political movements, for example, the women’s suf-
frage movements in the early twentieth century United States
and Britain; the civil rights movement in the 1960s United States;
and political movements in unconsolidated democracies, like Rus-
sia’s ongoing anticorruption protests and protests in Venezuela. In
these settings, getting people on the street may in itself be an aim
of the protest: achieving target protest sizes could directly achieve
policy concessions, and also signal the strength of a movement
to potential future participants. Strategic substitutability is most
likely during stages of a political movement when the public goods
component of a protest looms large relative to a movement’s ulti-
mate success. This does notmake the protest inconsequential: tan-
gible achievements are possible even in the absence of complete
success; movement survival and growth in the future may depend
on turnout in the present. It is important to emphasize, however,
that the dynamic signaling element of this mechanism will likely
not be relevant in one-shot mass events, like the Arab Spring
protests, which will either topple a regime or be crushed. One-shot
protests are more likely to exhibit strategic complementarity.
The second force for strategic substitutability in our setting is
subjects’ perception of an increase in the probability of a govern-
ment crackdown for larger protests. This force seems most likely
to exist in protests demanding political rights from regimes that
are not totalitarian (again, the women’s suffrage movements, the
civil rights movement, and protests in partial democracies). Many
regimes, even authoritarian ones, allow some freedom of expres-
sion and association; thus, small protests are likely to be toler-
ated. These regimes may not tolerate destabilizing large events,
and thus may be perceived as being more likely to crack down
on larger protests. This mechanism producing strategic substi-
tutability is unlikely to be present in settings where protests are
patently illegal, such as the Soviet Union and much of Eastern
Europe prior to 1989, North Korea, or in much of the Arab world.
In these cases, a government crackdown is essentially guaran-
teed, so the probability of bearing a private cost conditional on
a crackdown becomes the only consideration. In such settings,
larger protests are likely to be perceived as lower cost, thus push-
ing toward strategic complementarity.
Finally, the Be´nabou and Tirole (2011) logic of greater indi-
vidual signaling value of attending a smaller protest seems likely
to be quite general: political radicals will be able to more strongly
signal their type when a protest is small. It is important to note,
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/qje/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/qje/qjz002/5298503 by London School of Econom
ics user on 21 M
arch 2019
54 THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
however, that themagnitude of this effect may differ substantially
across types of protesters and across protests. Again, this force to-
ward substitutability may be especially pronounced in ongoing
movements, in which participation becomes part of one’s identity
and may be less relevant in one-shot events aimed at toppling a
dictator.
Future work thus should shed more light on the mechanisms
that underlie the strategic interactions in the protest game, ide-
ally exploring their heterogeneity across varying political settings.
It should also engage in the empirical analysis of protests that
are linked dynamically as part of larger political movements. In
our setting, a large July 1 march not only affects policy imme-
diately but also shapes the beliefs and behavior of citizens in
the antiauthoritarian movement more broadly. This means there
are dynamic considerations among protesters, learning among
protest participants and nonparticipants, and potentially impor-
tant cross-protest spillovers. Given that many protests are not
solitary events, understanding these dynamic processes is an
important area for future research.
LUDWIG-MAXIMILIANS-UNIVERSITA¨TMUNICH, CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC
POLICY RESEARCH, AND CESIFO
HARVARD UNIVERSITY AND ABDUL LATIF JAMEEL POVERTY ACTION
LAB
LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS, NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC
RESEARCH, AND CESIFO
HONG KONG UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
An Online Appendix for this article can be found at The Quar-
terly Journal of Economics online. Data and code replicating tables
and figures in this article can be found in Cantoni et al. (2019), in
the Harvard Dataverse, doi:10.7910/DVN/GVOMUR.
REFERENCES
Acemoglu, Daron, Tarek A. Hassan, and Ahmed Tahoun, “The Power of the Street:
Evidence From Egypt’s Arab Spring,” NBER Working Paper No. 20665, 2014.
Acemoglu, Daron, Suresh Naidu, Pascual Restrepo, and James A. Robinson,
“Democracy Does Cause Growth,” MITWorking Paper, 2015, http://economics.
mit.edu/files/11227.
Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson, “Why Did the West Extend the
Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115 (2000), 1167–1199.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/qje/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/qje/qjz002/5298503 by London School of Econom
ics user on 21 M
arch 2019
PROTESTS AS STRATEGIC GAMES 55
———, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2006).
———,WhyNations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty (New York:
Crown Business, 2012).
Aidt, Toke S., and Raphae¨l Franck, “How to Get the Snowball Rolling and Extend
the Franchise: Voting on the Great Reform Act of 1832,” Public Choice, 155
(2012), 229–250.
———, “Democratization under the Threat of Revolution: Evidence from the Great
Reform Act of 1832,” Econometrica, 83 (2015), 505–547.
Anderson, Michael L., “Multiple Inference and Gender Differences in the Effects
of Early Intervention: A Reevaluation of the Abecedarian, Perry Preschool,
and Early Training Projects,” Journal of the American Statistical Association,
103 (2008), 1481–1495.
Barbera`, Salvador, and Matthew O. Jackson, “A Model of Protests, Rev-
olution, and Information,” Working Paper, Stanford University, 2018,
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2732864.
Bates, Robert H., Ghada Fayad, and Anke Hoeffler, “The State of Democracy in
Sub-Saharan Africa,” International Area Studies Review, 15 (2012), 323–338
Be´nabou, Roland, and Jean Tirole, “Laws and Norms,” NBER Working Paper No.
17579, 2011.
Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan, “Regime Change and Revolutionary Entrepreneurs,”
American Political Science Review, 104 (2010), 446–466.
Cantoni, Davide, David Y. Yang, Noam Yuchtman, and Jane Zhang,
“The Fundamental Determinants of Anti-Authoritarianism,” Working Pa-
per, UC Berkeley, 2016, http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/yuchtman/Noam_
Yuchtman_files/antiauthoritarian_draft.pdf.
———, “Replication Data for: ‘Protests as Strategic Games: Experimental Ev-
idence from Hong Kong’s Antiauthoritarian Movement’,” (2019), Harvard
Dataverse, doi: 10.7910/DVN/GVOMUR.
Chwe, Michael Suk-Young, “Communication and Coordination in Social Net-
works,” Review of Economic Studies, 67 (2000), 1–16.
Coffman, Katherine B., Lucas C. Coffman, and Keith M. Marzilli Ericson, “The
Size of the LGBT Population and the Magnitude of Anti-Gay Sentiment Are
Substantially Underestimated,”Management Science, 63 (2017), 3168–3186.
Coffman, Lucas C., Clayton R. Featherstone, and Judd B. Kessler, “A
Model of Information Nudges,” Working Paper, Ohio State University,
2015, https://site.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/a_model_of_information_
nudges_20151124.pdf.
Croson, Rachel, “Theories of Commitment, Altruism and Reciprocity: Evi-
dence from Linear Public Goods Games,” Economic Inquiry, 45 (2007),
199–216.
Deaton, Angus, and Nancy Cartwright, “Understanding and Misunderstanding
Randomized Controlled Trials,” Social Science & Medicine, 210 (2018), 2–21.
DellaVigna, Stefano, Ruben Enikolopov, Vera Mironova, Maria Petrova, and Eka-
terina Zhuravskaya, “Cross-Border Media and Nationalism: Evidence from
Serbian Radio in Croatia,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics,
6 (2014), 103–132.
DellaVigna, Stefano, and Matthew Gentzkow, “Persuasion: Empirical Evidence,”
Annual Review of Economics, 2 (2010), 643–669.
DeLong, J. Bradford, and Andrei Shleifer, “Princes and Merchants: European City
Growth before the Industrial Revolution,” Journal of Law and Economics, 36
(1993), 671–702.
Edmond, Chris, “Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change,”
Review of Economic Studies, 80 (2013), 1422–1458.
Egorov, Georgy, and Konstantin Sonin, “Elections in Non-Democracies,” Working
Paper, University of Chicago, 2018.
Enikolopov, Ruben, AlexeyMakarin, andMaria Petrova, “SocialMedia and Protest
Participation: Evidence from Russia,” Working Paper, Universitat Pompeu
Fabra, 2016, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2696236.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/qje/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/qje/qjz002/5298503 by London School of Econom
ics user on 21 M
arch 2019
56 THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Enikolopov, Ruben, Alexey Makarin, Maria Petrova, and Leonid Polishchuk, “So-
cial Image, Networks, and Protest Participation,” Working Paper, Universitat
Pompeu Fabra, 2018.
Fearon, James D., “Self-Enforcing Democracy,” Quarterly Journal of Economics,
126 (2011), 1661–1708.
Fischbacher, Urs, Simon Ga¨chter, and Ernst Fehr, “Are People Conditionally Co-
operative? Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment,” Economics Letters, 71
(2001), 397–404.
Gehlbach, Scott, Konstantin Sonin, and Milan W. Svolik, “Formal Models of
Nondemocratic Politics,” Annual Review of Political Science, 19 (2016),
565–584.
Gerber, Alan S., and Donald P. Green, “The Effects of Canvassing, Telephone Calls,
and Direct Mail on Voter Turnout: A Field Experiment,” American Political
Science Review, 94 (2000), 653–663.
Gerber, Alan, Mitchell Hoffman, John Morgan, and Collin Raymond. “One in a
Million: Field Experiments on Perceived Closeness of the Election and Voter
Turnout,” Working Paper, University of Toronto, 2017.
Gerber, Alan S., Gregory A. Huber, David Doherty, Conor M. Dowling, Connor
Raso, and Shang E. Ha, “Personality Traits and Participation in Political
Processes,” Journal of Politics, 73 (2011), 692–706.
Gerring, John, Philip Bond, William Barndt, and Carola Moreno, “Democracy and
Growth: A Historical Perspective,” World Politics, 57 (2005), 323–364.
Gonza´lez, Felipe, “Collective Action in Networks: Evidence from the Chilean Stu-
dent Movement,” Working Paper, UC-Berkeley, 2016.
Granovetter, Mark, “Threshold Models of Collective Behavior,” American Journal
of Sociology, 83 (1978), 489–515.
Hobbs, William, and Margaret E. Roberts, “How Sudden Censorship Can Increase
Access to Information,” American Political Science Review, 112 (2018), 621–
636.
King, Gary, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts, “How Censorship in China
Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression,” American
Political Science Review, 107 (2013), 326–343.
Kricheli, Ruth, Yair Livne, and Beatriz Magaloni, “Taking to the Streets: Theory
and Evidence on Protests under Authoritarianism,” APSA Annual Meeting
Paper, 2011.
Kuran, Timur, “Sparks and Prairie Fires: A Theory of Unanticipated Political
Revolution,” Public Choice, 61 (1989), 41–74.
———, “The East European Revolution of 1989: Is it Surprising that We Were
Surprised?,” American Economic Review, 81 (1991), 121–125.
———, Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsifi-
cation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997).
Lizzeri, Alessandro, and Nicola Persico, “Why Did the Elites Extend the Suffrage?
Democracy and the Scope of Government, with an Application to Britain’s ‘Age
of Reform’,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119 (2004), 707–765.
Llavador, Humberto, and Robert J. Oxoby, “Partisan Competition, Growth, and
the Franchise,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120 (2005), 1155–1189.
Lohmann, Susanne, “The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday
Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989–91,”World Politics, 47 (1994),
42–101.
Lorentzen, Peter, “Regularizing Rioting: Permitting Public Protest in an Authori-
tarian Regime,” Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 8 (2013), 127–158.
Madestam, Andreas, Daniel Shoag, Stan Veuger, and David Yanagizawa-Drott,
“Do Political Protests Matter? Evidence from the Tea Party Movement,” Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, 128 (2013), 1633–1685.
Manacorda, Marco, and Andrea Tesei, “Liberation Technology: Mobile Phones and
Political Mobilization in Africa,” Working Paper, Queen Mary University of
London, 2016.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/qje/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/qje/qjz002/5298503 by London School of Econom
ics user on 21 M
arch 2019
PROTESTS AS STRATEGIC GAMES 57
Meyersson, Erik, “Political Man on Horseback: Military Coups and Devel-
opment.” Working Paper, SITE, Stockholm School of Economics, 2016,
https://erikmeyersson.files.wordpress.com/2015/04/coups_meyersson_1504.
pdf.
Myatt, David P., “A Theory of Protest Voting,” The Economic Journal, 127 (2017),
1527–1567.
Olson, Mancur. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of
Groups (New York: Schocken Books, 1965).
Opp, Karl-Dieter, and Christiane Gern, “Dissident Groups, Personal Networks,
and Spontaneous Cooperation: The East German Revolution of 1989,” Ameri-
can Sociological Review, 58 (1993), 659–680.
Palfrey, Thomas, and Howard Rosenthal, “Participation and the Provision of Dis-
crete Public Goods: A Strategic Analysis,” Journal of Public Economics, 24
(1984), 171–193.
Papaioannou, Elias, and Gregorios Siourounis, “Democratisation and Growth,”
Economic Journal, 118 (2008), 1520–1551.
Passarelli, Francesco, and Guido Tabellini, “Emotions and Political Unrest,” Jour-
nal of Political Economy, 125 (2017), 903–946.
Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini, “Democracy and Development: The Devil
in the Details,” American Economic Review, 96 (2006), 319–324.
———, “The Growth Effect of Democracy: Is it Heterogenous and How Can It Be
Estimated?,” In Institutions and Economic Performance, Elhanan Helpman,
ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008).
Przeworski, Adam, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose´ Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando
Limongi. Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being
in the World, 1950–1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
Przeworski, Adam, and Fernando Limongi, “Political Regimes and Economic
Growth,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7 (1993), 51–69.
Raghavarao, Damaraju, and Walter T. Federer, “Block Total Response as an Alter-
native to the Randomized Response Method in Surveys,” Journal of the Royal
Statistical Society, Series B, 41 (1979), 40–45.
Reny, Marie-Eve, “Authoritarianism as a Research Constraint: Political Scientists
in China,” Social Science Quarterly, 97 (2016), 909–922.
Rodrik, Dani, and Romain Wacziarg, “Do Democratic Transitions Produce Bad
Economic Outcomes?,” American Economic Review, 95 (2005), 50–55.
Shadmehr, Mehdi, “Tullock’s Paradox, Pivotal Revolutionaries and the Strength
of Weak States,” Working Paper, University of Calgary, 2018.
Shadmehr, Mehdi, and Dan Bernhardt, “Collective Action with Uncertain Payoffs:
Coordination, Public Signals and Punishment Dilemmas,” American Political
Science Review, 105 (2011), 829–851.
Tullock, Gordon, “The Paradox of Revolution,” Public Choice, 11 (1971), 89–99.
Yanagizawa-Drott, David, “Propaganda and Conflict: Evidence from the Rwandan
Genocide,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129 (2014), 1947–1994.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/qje/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/qje/qjz002/5298503 by London School of Econom
ics user on 21 M
arch 2019
